Antecedents and Consequences of Nepotism: A Social Psychological Exploration by Rajpaul-Baptiste, Cindy
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Rajpaul-Baptiste, Cindy  (2018) Antecedents and Consequences of Nepotism: A Social Psychological
Exploration.   Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,.
DOI





































School of Psychology, 
 






This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor 










List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………………………………...v 






Chapter 1 ...............................................................................................................1 
 
1.1. Chapter summary ............................................................................................1 
 
1.2. Introduction ....................................................................................................2 
 




1.3.2. Facets of nepotism and research traditions ..................................................5 
 
1.4. Factors that give rise to nepotism ...................................................................9 
 
1.4.1. Current state of knowledge ..........................................................................9 
 
1.4.1.1. Organisational level antecedents ............................................................ 10 
 
1.4.1.2. Societal level antecedents ...................................................................... 13 
 
1.4.1.3. Individual level antecedents ................................................................... 16 
 
1.4.2. Unanswered questions .............................................................................. 17 
 
1.4.2.1. The importance of family ties ................................................................. 17 
 
1.4.2.2. The importance of power and dominance .............................................. 20 
1.4.2.3 Social Dominance theory ……………………………………………………………………….25 
 
1.4.2.4. The importance of meritocracy and opportunism .................................. 29 
 
1.5. Consequences of nepotism .......................................................................... 34 
 
1.5.1. Current state of knowledge ....................................................................... 34 
 
1.5.1.1. Organisation level consequences............................................................ 35 
 
1.5.1.2. Individual level consequences ................................................................ 37 
 
1.5.2. Unanswered questions .............................................................................. 40 
 
1.5.2.1. The drawbacks of unqualified nepotistic ................................................ 41 
 
1.5.2.2. The benefits of hiring qualified nepots ................................................... 43 
 
1.6. Summary and outlook .................................................................................. 47 
 




2.1. Chapter summary ......................................................................................... 54 
 
2.2. Studies overview .......................................................................................... 55 
 
2.3. Study 1 ......................................................................................................... 56 
 
2.3.1. Methods .................................................................................................... 59 
 
2.3.1.1. Participants and design ........................................................................... 59 
 
2.3.1.2. Procedure and materials ........................................................................ 59 
 
2.3.2. Results ....................................................................................................... 62 
 
2.3.2.1. Data preparation .................................................................................... 62 
 
2.3.2.2. Main analysis .......................................................................................... 62 
 
2.3.3. Discussion .................................................................................................. 64 
 
2.4. Study 2 ......................................................................................................... 65 
 
2.4.1. Methods .................................................................................................... 68 
 
2.4.1.1. Participants and design ........................................................................... 68 
 
2.4.1.2. Procedure and materials ........................................................................ 69 
 
2.5. Results .......................................................................................................... 75 
 
2.5.1.1. Data preparation .................................................................................... 75 
 
2.5.2.2. Country-level differences ....................................................................... 76 
 
2.5.2.3. Individual-level differences ..................................................................... 85 
 
2.6. Discussion ..................................................................................................... 89 
 
2.7. Coda ............................................................................................................. 93 
 
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................ 95 
 
3.1. Chapter summary ......................................................................................... 95 
 
3.2. Studies overview .......................................................................................... 96 
 




3.3.1.1. Participants and design………………………………………………………………………..101 
 
3.3.1.2. Procedure and materials ...................................................................... 103 
 
3.3.1.3. Ethics .................................................................................................... 108 
 




3.3.2.1. Data preparation .................................................................................. 109 
 
3.3.2.2. Main analysis ........................................................................................ 111 
 
3.3.2.2.1. Ratings ............................................................................................... 111 
 
3.3.2.1.2. Commissioned officers ...................................................................... 122 
 
3.3.3. Discussion ................................................................................................ 122 
 
3.4. Study 4 ....................................................................................................... 125 
 
3.4.1. Methods .................................................................................................. 126 
 
3.4.1.1. Participants and design ......................................................................... 126 
 
3.4.1.2. Procedure and materials ...................................................................... 127 
 
3.4.2. Results ..................................................................................................... 130 
 
3.4.2.1. Data preparation .................................................................................. 130 
 
3.4.2.2. Manipulation check .............................................................................. 131 
 
3.4.2.3. Main analysis ........................................................................................ 131 
 
3.4.3. Discussion ................................................................................................ 134 
 
3.5. Coda ........................................................................................................... 136 
 
Chapter 4 .......................................................................................................... 138 
 
4.1. Chapter summary ....................................................................................... 138 
 
4.2. Main findings .............................................................................................. 138 
 
4.3. Contributions to the literature ................................................................... 143 
 
4.4. Practical implications .................................................................................. 147 
 
4.5. Limitations .................................................................................................. 150 
 
4.6. Future research .......................................................................................... 151 
 
4.7. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 152 
 
5. References .................................................................................................... 154 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................ 202 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................ 204 











Table 1.1 Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α), 62 
 correlations, means and standard deviations  
Table 1.2 Regression analysis predicting variations in 63 
 nepotism endorsement     
Table 2.1 Prevalence and endorsement of nepotism in 80 
 different countries     
Table 2.2 Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α), 83 
 correlations, means and standard deviations  
Table 2.3 Regression analysis predicting variations in 85 
 nepotism endorsement     
Table 2.4 Individual-level variable predictors mediating 87 
 country-level differences in   nepotism  
 endorsement      
Table 3.1 Frequency of Ratings and Officers according to 102 
 their entrance status     
Table 3.2 Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α), 110 
 correlations, means and standard deviations  
Table 3.3 Comparison  of  ratings’  work  attitudes, 115 
 perception of organisational procedures, well-  
 being, and performance as a function of their  
 entrance status      
Table 3.4 Perceived employee commitment and well- 132 
 being in experimental conditions   
Table 3.5 Perceived employee autonomy and control in 133 





List of Figures 
 
Figure 4.1  Conceptual model of Nepotism Endorsement  141 
 




All praise and thanks to Father God, Jesus Christ my Lord and Saviour and 
Holy Spirit, your grace, mercy and relentless love throughout every part of my life 
makes all things possible, I could do all things through Christ Jesus who is the 
source of my strength, hope and joy. 
 
To Mario my supervisor your continuous support, kindness, guidance, 
advice along with your witty but dry sense of humour, has helped me achieve a 
lifetime goal, you were my community at university as I worked from home, and 
you never failed me. Your support was immeasurably more than I could have ever 
asked for. I would always be grateful to God for you. Thank you for taking me on 
as your student and seeing me through all the way to the end. 
 
To my amazing family, Brett (my dearest hubby), my incredible and 
beautiful sisters aka my gladiators Sarah and Cintra (in heaven now), my loving 
mum, Clarinda, Marlon M and finally the “ducs” KGB (also in heaven) you all are 
and have always been a blessing from Jesus. Each of you are a gift from God. 
Thank you for always believing in me, for always having my back and always 
loving me. Your support and help have been a pillar of encouragement 
throughout this process. I am so thankful to have each of you in my life. 
 
Thank you to Clement Iton you set me on the road to success a long time ago. 
To all my friends aka sisters from a different mother Helen, Ngozi and the rest of the 





at university my fairy godmother who always have the answers to my questions, 
 
the girls on the admin desk and my extended family your encouragement and 
 







Nepotism is a phenomenon that has engulfed the nature of work in 
private-and public-sector organisations for centuries. Nepotism is not limited to 
third world countries; it occurs both in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. 
So, it is a worldwide issue which needs addressing in today’s society. In spite of 
the relevance and vast reach of nepotism, psychological studies into the concept 
are scant. It remains largely unknown why some people endorse nepotistic 
practices, whereas others do not. Similarly, the consequences of nepotism for 
individuals and organisations remain poorly understood. The aim of this thesis is 
to contribute towards addressing these gaps. 
 
This thesis starts by examining psychological constructs that predict 
variations in the perception and endorsement of nepotism between individuals 
(Study 1) and countries (Study 2). Studies 3 and 4 investigate the actual and 
perceived consequences of nepotism on employees. The aim of the studies is to 
advance the research body around nepotism by adopting a psychological 
perspective examining the genesis of nepotism at an individual and country 
level to aid our understanding of antecedents and consequences of nepotism. 
 
Findings from Study 1 highlight that Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) - a 
psychological trait that reflects a preference for inequality and social stratification 
 
– is instrumental in predicting attitudes towards nepotism; the higher the 





nepotistic practices. Findings from Study 2, a cross-cultural study, further 
underscore the importance of social dominance and power distance in promoting 
individual- and country-level differences in the endorsement of nepotism. India a 
high-power distance country with a collectivist culture had the highest prevalence 
and endorsement of nepotism when compared to the USA, with Trinidad and 
Greece falling in between the former two countries. Variations in SDO and family 
orientation contributed to explain individual-level variations in the endorsement 
of nepotism as well as differences between countries. 
 
Studies 3 and 4 examine the role of qualifications as a factor that may moderate 
the consequences of nepotism for individuals and organisations. Study 3 indicates 
that individuals recruited through nepotistic means and suitably qualified thrive in 
their jobs; they have higher levels of performance, enhanced well-being and 
experience greater levels of autonomy and control. In contrast, individuals hired 
through nepotistic means without suitable levels of qualification showed evidence 
of poor psychological well-being, lower levels of autonomy and control, and 
underperformance. All in all, the study highlights potential benefits and 
drawbacks of nepotistic hirings and the crucial role of qualifications in 
determining whether nepotism produces positive or negative outcomes. Probing 
the perceived consequences of nepotism with and without qualifications, Study 4 
showed that people appear to have a limited understanding of the importance of 
qualifications for determining employees’ well-being and levels of autonomy and 
control. The thesis concludes with a discussion of contributions, limitations, and 
xi 













1.1. Chapter summary 
 
Nepotism is a widespread phenomenon and exists within all types of 
organisations, including those that are not run by families (Bellow, 2003; Jones, 
Stout, Harder, Levine, Levive, & Sanchez, 2008; Jones, 2012; Padgett & Morris, 
2005; Vinton, 1998). Curiously, knowledge of the causes and consequences of 
nepotistic practices is scant (Padgett & Morris, 2005; Jones, 2012), and the few 
studies that have been conducted in this area often produced contradictory 
results. Drawing on social psychological theories and principles, the thesis 
provides a systematic investigation of antecedents of nepotism by looking at the 
roles of family ties, power distance and social dominance, and meritocracy and 
opportunism, which I argue can lead individuals to endorse nepotism to varying 
extents. This is followed by a discussion of the consequences of nepotism focusing 
on work-attitudes, performance, and employee well-being. I will make a case for 
the role of qualifications in determining positive and negative consequences for 
beneficiaries of nepotism. In particular, I aim to highlight the differences between 
beneficiaries of nepotism who are qualified for the position and those who gain a 







“All experience teaches that, whenever there is a great national 
establishment, employing large numbers of officials, the public must be 
reconciled to support many incompetent men; for such is the favouritism 
and nepotism always prevailing in the purlieus of these establishments, that 
some incompetent persons are always admitted, to the exclusion of many of 




There have been many recorded instances of nepotism going back to Biblical 
times: King David believed his son Solomon was chosen by God and therefore 
appointed him to be the next king, even though he was young and inexperienced 
(1 Chronicles 29: 1, New Living Translation); of course it turned out he was the 
wisest and greatest king that ever-ruled Israel (1 Kings 3:9-12, New Living 
Translation). Given the history of nepotism, it is perhaps not a surprise that some 
biologists have argued that nepotism is ‘hardwired’ to promote the survival of our 
genes (Alexander, 1982). 
 
Evidence of nepotistic practices can be found universally across the globe 
(Bellow, 2003; Hooker, 2009), ranging from countries such as Sweden - one of the 
least corrupt cultures in the world according to the Corruption Perception Index 
2017 (CPI) (Sundell, 2014) - to the Middle East, which is one of the most corrupt 





industrialised nations, including America where it is not uncommon for First 
families and high raking government officials to share family ties (Bellow, 2003). 
In a recent example of these practices, the president of the United States of 
America appointed his daughter to take his place at the G20 summit, which she 
is not qualified for (“Ivanka Trump”, 2017). These and similar nepotistic 
tendencies in American politics are curious, given that many US states have 
explicitly outlawed nepotism in organisations in a bid to discourage the (unfair) 
employment of family members. 
 
There are several other examples globally of nepotism at the level of 
government. In Greece, the former Finance Minister was investigated for 
appointing relatives into high positions who evaded paying taxes (“Greek Ex-
minister”, 2012). Likewise, in India, a member of the Gandhi family spoke out 
about the lack of meritocracy and made charges of corruption and nepotism in 
the current political administration (Biswas, 2013). In the EU in 1999, the 
Committee of Independent Experts requested the resignation of The Santer 
Commissioner because many relatives and friends of the commissioner were 
allegedly appointed to senior bureaucratic posts (Shore, 2005). 
 
All of these examples illustrate that nepotism is an important global 
phenomenon and it is flourishing (Kunzar & Fredrick, 2007; Riggio & Riggio, 2013; 
Zgheib, 2014). It also demonstrates that nepotism is not limited geographically or 





Interestingly, the prevalence of nepotism stands in contrast to people’s 
perceptions of nepotistic practices. Ewing (1965) found that 85% of surveyed 
managers opposed the use of factors other than merit in hiring and other 
personnel decisions; yet nepotism has continued in contemporary practices. 
There is no evidence that the proportion of individuals opposing nepotistic 
practices in the workplace is declining or that the outcry against this practice 








The expression nepotism derives from the Italian word nipote meaning 
 
"relative". During the 15th and 16th century nepotismo was thriving in the church 
as illegitimate papal sons, or "nephews", were appointed to religious positions. 
Traditionally, nepotism describes the favouring of blood relations. Simon, Clark 
and Tifft (1966) defined nepotism as “the bestowal of patronage by reason of 
relationship regardless of merit” (p. 345) . Similarly, Bellow (2003) places the 
inter-generational transmission of property, knowledge, authority, cultural 
traditions and values from one kin to another at the heart of the concept. 
Adopting a looser definition of nepotism, Ponzo and Scoppa (2010) surmised that 
managers nepotistically appointed family members, friends, and those connected 





than their merits. In this view, nepotism does not only imply favouring ones’ own 
relatives, but more broadly favouring individuals with strong ties to an 
organisation (Jones, 2013). This extends Bellow’s (2003) definition of nepotism as 
“favouritism based on kinship” (p. 11) and encompasses favouritism based on 
social bonds. 
 
This thesis takes an intermediate view and defines nepotism as the 
practice of favouring the family members of individuals who are connected to an 
organisation. In organisational settings, nepotistic practices tend to affect hiring 




1.3.2. Facets of nepotism and research traditions 
 
The concept of nepotism has been studied in a range of disciplines, 
including evolutionary biology, anthropology, religion, history, economics, 
political science, and sociology (Hamilton, 1964; Park, Schaller, & VanVugt, 2008; 
Simon, Clark, & Tiff, 1966; Williams, 1992). Nepotism is a multidimensional 
concept that is sometimes described as an ideology manifested in individuals, 
groups, organisations, economic strands, and countries (Jones, 2004; Katz & 
Kahn, 1978; Senge, 1990). 
 
In management and psychological science, nepotism and its effects have 
generally been examined at a macro-level with an emphasis on the service 





Gyimah-Boadi, 2000; Mutlu, 2000). Much research on nepotism focusses on 
family-owned businesses (Jones 2012; Mhatre, Riggio, & Riggio, 2012; Mulder, 
2012; Padgett, Padgett & Morris, 2015), although as indicated earlier 
nepotistic practices can be found in other organisations too. Families have 
been running family-owned business for centuries and remain an unshakeable 
force behind many successful modern work forces globally. For example, in 
America one in eight Fortune 500 companies are either family-owned or 
controlled by an established family (Bellow, 2003; Lansberg, 1983). 
 
Many previous studies of nepotism have been opinion-based drawing on 
anecdotal evidence (e.g., Maestripieri, 2012; Padgett, Padgett & Morris, 2015). 
Some studies have employed surveys to discern individuals’ attitudes towards 
nepotism, which, as indicated earlier, often tend to be negative (Abdalla, 
Magharabi, & Raggard, 1998; Ewing, 1965; Ford & McLaughlin, 1986; Hayajenh, 
Maghrabi, & Al-Dabbagh, 1994). 
 
Studies of nepotism have focussed on specific professions such as human 
resources management, bank managers, hotel managers, and police (Abdalla et al., 
1998; Arasli, Bavik, & Ekiz, 2006; Scoppa, 2009; Wated & Sanchez, 2013). In the 
context of family-owned-businesses, past research has employed a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods (Ciulla, 2005; Denison, Lief, &; 
Dickson, Nieminen, & Biermeier-Hanson, 2012; Mhatre et al., 2012; Padgett & 





acknowledged that there is a paucity of empirical studies examining the 
consequences of nepotism both from an individual and organisational level 
perspective (Arasli, Alper, & Doh, 2015; Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Keles, Ozkan, & 
Bezirci, 2011; Padgett & Morris, 2005, 2012). 
 
Nepotism encompasses both unmerited hiring decisions based on family 
ties (Simon, Clark, & Tiff, 1966), favouritism based on mere kinship coined as “old 
nepotism” by Bellow (2003, p.12), as well as intergeneration career paths that 
leads to hiring based on merit (Jones, Stout, Harder, Levine, Levine, & Sanchez, 
2008). Bellow (2003) refers to the latter as “new nepotism” (p. 15), adding that it 
involves the tendency of qualified descendants to intentionally select professions 
identical to their parents. This is important because it implies that nepotism need 
not preclude merit. Similarly, Stout, Levesque and Jones (2007) argue that 
nepotistic practices can entail thoughtful career-related choices as well as 
impetuous opportunism. However, others such as Wong and Kliener (1994) argue 
that nepotistic behaviour is predominantly apparent in the hiring and promotion 
inadequately qualified or unqualified relatives in public and private sectors, 
including family-owned business. As such, nepotism often remains the antithesis 
of hiring qualified individuals to fill vacant positions (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 









Affirmative action and nepotism are to some extent overlapping. One of 
the most frequently cited negative aspects in both affirmative action and 
nepotism is the idea of (unwarranted) preferential treatment and the hiring or 
promotion of individuals upon factors other than merit (Bellow, 2003; Ford & 
McLaughlin, 1986; Kravitz, Harrison, Turner, Levine, Chavees, Brannick, & 
Conard, 1997). As a result, there is a stigma associated with both practices. The 
stigma surrounding affirmative action results from the assumption that an 
individual is selected for a position as a result of group membership rather than 
qualifications (Golden, Hinkle, & Crosby, 2001; Harris, Lievens, & Van Hoye, 2004; 
Heilman, 1994; Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992; Heilman, Simon, & Repper, 1987; 
Kluegel & Smith, 1983, as cited in Jones, 2013, p. 238). 
 
Much of the stigma associated with nepotism arises from the belief that 
nepotism implies not only favouring a relative, but also favouring someone who is 
unqualified, or incompetent compared to other applicants (Bellow, 2003). 
Although the basis of preferential treatment may differ between the two 
concepts (e.g., race or gender versus kinship), negative reactions and 
consequences, specifically for beneficiaries, are common to both affirmative 
action and nepotism (Welle, 2004). 
 
Nepotism has been described as a set of psychological and social 
processes associated with family membership in an organisation (Jones, 
 





from kinship and in-group favouritism because unlike kinship and to some extent 
in-group favouritism, nepotism has a more unequivocally negative connotation 
attached to it (Bellow, 2003; Jones, 2012). Furthermore, Sidani and Thornberry 
(2013) suggested that the practice of nepotism is unlike any other group 
membership, as it offers its stakeholders advantages such as access to influential 
networks based on family connections that would otherwise not be accessible. 
Furthermore, according to Sidani and Thornberry (2013) the close connection 
between its members through kinship, culture, community and reciprocity makes 
bonds in nepotistic networks particularly strong. Another interesting 
characteristic of nepotism, given its long history and pervasiveness across 
cultures, is its apparent adaptive power. Nepotism has been part of the working 
culture globally for centuries (Bellow, 2003); it has been described as a 
fundamental part of our survival and success as a species (Bellow, 2003; Jones, 
2012; Muchinsky, 2012). This has led to the supposition that nepotism is 
“hardwired” in just the same way as language and emotions have strong 




1.4. Factors that give rise to nepotism 
 
1.4.1. Current state of knowledge 
 
In America approximately 95% of businesses are owned by family, including 





owned businesses hire family members to run and manage the businesses (Ciulla, 
2005). The same applies to family-owned businesses around the world. However, 
nepotism is not just limited to the business world; it is also prevalent across 
 
the arts, sports and politics to name a few. For example, American and United 
Kingdom politics have seen the likes of Bush, Clinton, Dole, 
 
Powell, Miliband, Wintour and Alexander appointed in powerful positions (Ciulla, 
2005; Keeble & Reeves, 2005) over the years. The question arises what are the 
factors that make nepotism more or less acceptable? In other words, what are 
the circumstances in which individuals are more or less inclined to endorse 
nepotistic practices? The following sections address this question with a focus on 




1.4.1.1. Organisational level antecedents 
 
Nepotism is an organisational culture that is affected by certain 
 
organisational characteristics such as an organisation’s size and location. For 
example, smaller family-owned businesses in less developed counties are more 
likely to employ nepotistic practices especially in the early stages. This is due to 
factors such as family loyalty, lower risk, lower turnover, maintaining the family 
name, and transference of human capital from one generation to the next (Danco, 
1982; Hayajenh, Maghraki, & Al-Dabbagh, 1994; Jones et al., 2008; Laker & 





restricted to the developing world. Across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the 
Americas, Africa, and India the greater share of organisations are family-owned 
firms (Bellow, 2003; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). Some of the largest retailers 
in the UK and USA such as BskyB, Wal-Mart and Ford Motors are family-owned. 
Many family-owned firms are privately held firms but there is also a fair share of 
publicly operated companies managed by families (Burkart, Panuszi & Shliefer, 
2003). 
 
As such, family-owned firms come in a variety of shapes and sizes, from local 
corner shops to global multinational organisations. Dyer (2006) created a 
typology of family firms. From this typology he inferred that some family firms 
were more likely to enlist nepotistic practices. He mooted the concept of a clan 
family (i.e. family firms where family relationships and involvement reduce the 
external cost of running the company and promote human capital transfer); of 
mom and pop family firms (i.e., small firms such as farms and family-owned 
restaurants, which are run from one generation to another); and of self-
interested family firms (i.e., the firm is solely geared towards creating benefits for 
family members employed by the firm). Dyer (2006) suggested that these types of 
family firms are more inclined to endorse nepotistic practices due to their size, 
success, opportunism, economic turnover and use of human capital available 





It stands to reason that family-owned businesses are often structured 
around meeting the developmental needs of the family. Spranger (2005) argues 
that family members within family-owned business (FOBs) seemingly do not 
regard nepotism as a negative practice, as they are more likely to view 
preferential treatment as an inherent part of a family business culture. 
Consequently, nepotism in family-owned businesses is less likely to be seen in a 
negative light since brand names trade from one generation to the next. For 
example, brand names such as Johnson & Johnson, Ford Motors, and Loreal are 
infamous for passing their business to successive generations without any public 
outcry of unfairness or violation of merit-based principles. Nepotism within 
family run firms may be beneficial for these organisations to the extent that 
family members share the same values, goals, and ambition to maintain the 
family business (Bellow, 2003). Family members are also less likely to leave their 
firms for other firms due to a sense of loyalty, values and commitment 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). 
 
Matthews (1997; cited in Slack, 2001) carried out an empirical study into 
firm performance showing that family-run firms often performed better than 
(comparable) non-family-run firms. This led to the suggestion by Slack (2001) that 
family run firms adopt nepotistic practices to increase firm performance (Padgett 





However, nepotistic practices in the public sector, for example politicians 
appointing their spouses or partners into public office (Hulse & O’Connor, 2009) 
or appointing family members to government positions for which they may not be 
qualified (McGraw, 2008), generally results in the public feeling dismayed and let 
down (Dickson et al., 2012). 
 
Organisational culture describes the dominant values and beliefs that 
ultimately shape employees’ behaviour. In family-owned businesses, the 
founder’s values and beliefs fundamentally shape and form the culture of the 
organisation. For example, Chrisman, Chua and Zahra (2003) and Chrisman, Chua 
and Sharma (2003) suggested family-owned business owners’ and managers’ 
values, beliefs and principles are likely to influence practices and developments 
within the business including allocation of resources and people. Nepotism 
provides a means of preserving and reinforcing the extant culture (Denison et al., 
2004). Similarly, Pfeffer (1997) argued that nepotistic hiring can be advocated as a 
way of creating a “communal organisation” (Padgett, Padgett & Morris, 2015, p. 
285), which inspires a holistic sense of care for its employees and creates a 




1.4.1.2. Societal level antecedents 
 
The existence and prevalence of nepotism can be seen in societies across the 





as Guanxi (Zhang & Li, 2003), in Russia as Blat (Onoshchenko & Williams, 2013), 
and in the Philippines as utang na loob or debt of gratitude (Quah, 2006). 
Previous research has suggested that nepotism may be established in cultural 
values (Wated & Sanchez, 2015). In traditional cultures such as those in Asian 
countries, nepotism is often seen as the norm (Quah, 1999). Here, cultural values 
put an emphasis on family loyalty, which is placed above other loyalties (e.g., civic 
loyalty) (Robertson-Snape, 1999). Consequently, it would be the duty of any 
official in public office to seek the interest of his family and community and to 
further their economic and employment opportunities; this is considered 
perfectly legitimate (Quah, 1999; Robertson-Snape, 1999). The same applies to 
Indian cultures where individuals with a position of power could dispense 
personal favours to their family and expect such favours to be reciprocated 
(Robertson-Snape, 1999). 
 
Scoppa (2009) examined the suggestion that parents working in the public 
sector in Italy use their position and networks for the benefit of their children. 
Drawing on data from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
conducted by the Bank of Italy every two years with samples of approximately 
8,000 Italian households, the author showed that children of public sector 
workers were more likely to find a public sector job at any educational 
 
level. Public sector jobs are particularly prevalent in the southern regions of Italy 





between individuals’ socio-economic circumstances and the prevalence of 
nepotism. 
 
Collectivist values and beliefs are known to foster greater levels of 
cohesion, support, trust and unity amongst social collectives such as the extended 
family. In these socio-cultural settings, behaviour is governed by strong kinship 
bonds, which appear to be particularly prevalent amongst family-owned firms 
(Chakrabarty, 2009; Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & 
Heyman, 1996). 
 
Perceptions of the economic effectiveness of nepotism also seem to differ 
between cultures. In Western cultural settings, nepotism is often considered 
inferior to meritocratic practices. However, in other cultural settings such as 
China or Arab nations, nepotism is often regarded as effective, and as a factor 
that contributes to economic growth (Sidani & Thornberry, 2013). 
 
Cultural variations cannot be mapped solely onto an East/West divide. 
Indeed, in some Western cultural settings, nepotism also serves an important 
function in the pursuit of economic goals. As mentioned previously, work by 
Scoppa (2009) suggests that parents in Italy with influential jobs in the public 
sector are more inclined to help and encourage their children to find employment 
in careers similar to theirs. 
 
Societal variations in nepotism can be formalised in law, as illustrated by 










1.4.1.3. Individual level antecedents 
 
Evolutionary perspectives notwithstanding, individual-level variables that 
may predict the endorsement of nepotism have been largely neglected in the 
literature. Notable exceptions include work by Wated and Sanchez (2005; 2015), 
who suggested that collectivistic values may pre-dispose Latin American 
managers to tolerate nepotism, and this would be reflected in individuals’ 
attitudes, subjective norms and attributions. Individuals’ attitudes towards 
nepotism refers to their beliefs that the practice of nepotism is acceptable or 
unacceptable; subjective norms refer to societal standards or expectations 
regarding prevalence and endorsement of nepotistic practices; and attributions 
refers to individuals’ beliefs surrounding the availability of resources and 
opportunities that facilitate nepotistic practices (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen & 
Madden, 1986; Wated & Sanchez, 2005). The results of their empirical study 
showed that managers’ attitudes, subjective norms and attributions were 
significant predictors of the intention to discipline nepotistic employees. 
 
Similarly, Mulder (2012) suggested that in order to understand the 
acceptance of nepotism, one needs to consider the position of family 





goals, and position within the organisation may help explain whether 




1.4.2. Unanswered questions 
 
Jones (2012) identified the need to investigate socio-cultural dimensions 
to understand how these factors shape the prevalence and consequences of 
nepotism. Similarly, Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin, Reay (2013) highlighted the 
need for cross-cultural studies to gain a better understanding of nepotism. They 
added that most concerns related to nepotism are put forward in Western 
individualistic cultures. However, even though it appears that nepotism is more 
widely accepted in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Asian, Latin American, Indian 
cultures), direct empirical evidence for the link between socio-cultural variables is 
scant. What is more, the precise mechanisms that underpin socio-cultural 
variations in the endorsement of nepotism are poorly understood. In what 
follows, I will describe the functions of the primary theoretical framework Social 
Dominance Theory framework, which links together the variables under 
investigation in this thesis.  I will review the potential roles of family ties, 
meritocratic beliefs, and power relations as variables that may explain 
differences in the extent to which nepotism is endorsed and practiced. 
1.4.2.1. The importance of family ties 
 
As indicated earlier, there are grounds to believe that nepotism is more 
common and more strongly endorsed in collectivistic (vs. individualistic) 
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cultural settings (Kyriacou, 2016). Since collectivism and individualism can 
represent the dominant values which make up people’s social environment; 
these values or attitudes can impact people’s work life and affect their 
behaviour at work, the decisions made during hiring and promotion, and the 
allocation of rewards to fellow in-group members (Wated & Sanchez, 2015; 
Yang et al., 2012). 
 
Individualism is more commonly found in most European countries and 
North America. Individuals within an individualistic society are more inclined to be 
self-centred and self-reliant (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Marcelo, Asai, & Lucca, 
1988). In contrast, collectivism is more commonly found in Asia, South America, 
Latin America, and a few European countries like Greece. Here, the emphasis lies 
on how one’s actions affect others (Basabe & Ros, 2005), and on duties and 
obligations towards others (Hui, 1988; Triandis et al., 1988). In close-knit 
collectivistic structures, the most important in-group is the family (Chakrabarty, 
2009). It has been argued that in collectivist societies, it would appear almost 
uncaring not to help friends and family and would conflict with the notion of 
putting family first (Fukuyama, 2011, 2014). 
 
In a collectivist society, individuals are more likely to be concerned with the way 
their action affects others; their core beliefs centre around duty and obligation 
towards the in-group (Basabe & Ros, 2005). These inclinations boost conformity, 
accommodating the requirements of the in-group, and putting the needs of 
family, friends and in-group first (Basabe & Ros, 2005). Findings from Wated and 
Sanchez’s (2015) empirical study in Latin American collectivist cultures suggest 
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that nepotism serves the purpose of creating ties and connections between 
family members and friends. The authors also proposed that individuals support 
and tolerate nepotism because of their collectivistic values, which emphasise 
interdependence. They concluded that culture may act as an antecedent of 
nepotism by influencing individuals’ attitudes, subjective norms and attributions. 
 
It should be noted that even within set cultures there can be disparity along 
cultural dimensions. For example, Pillay and Dorasamy (2010) noted that 
collectivist cultures some individuals subscribe to collectivistic principles more 
than others. This suggests that even within a given cultural setting, there may be 
quite significant variations in the value individuals attach to family ties, and this 
may contribute to variations in individuals’ endorsement of nepotism. 
 
Previous studies have looked at family ties indirectly through a cultural 
perspective. This approach confounds family ties with other social and economic 
conditions, micro-geographies, and political circumstances. The notion that 
family ties are important in determining people’s attitudes towards nepotism is 
consistent with Jaskiewicz and colleagues’ (2013) theoretical model, which posits 
that social exchange relationships are more likely to produce reciprocal nepotism. 
Similarly, Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) reported an empirical study showing that 
people with strong family ties trusted strangers less than those with weak family 
ties. Drawing on these findings as well as the literature on collectivism, it stands 
to reason that the stronger individuals’ family ties, the more individuals tend to 






1.4.2.2. The importance of power and dominance 
 
The culture of a country or society varies in the way they perceive and 
endorse inequality, hierarchy and egalitarianism/ meritocracy. Societies as a 
whole are presented with dilemmas associated with managing relationships 
amongst groups, inequality in status, wealth and power (Basabe & Ros, 2005). 
Some cultures are more inclined to endorse hierarchical relations over egalitarian 
relations - a phenomenon that Hofstede (1983) coined power distance. For 
example, countries like India endorse inequality and hierarchical relations, which 
form a principal component of society (Hofstede, 1980; 1983). 
 
Countries with low power distance are more likely to show a preference for 
shared decision making, see each other as equal, have equal rights, and engage in 
informal communication, which is direct and characterised by a degree of 
participation from all levels (Hofstede 2001). However, countries with high power 
distance are more likely to have a high degree of acceptance for inequality 
between high power/status and low power/status individuals. Furthermore, 





engage in deference rather than challenge unethical behaviour from superiors 
(Basabe & Ros, 2005; Curtis, Conover, & Chui, 2012; Hofstede, 2010). 
 
Power distance and the associated tendency to endorse inequality have had 
little mention in the literature on nepotism. A handful of studies have examined 
ethical practices such as whistleblowing and corruption because higher power 
distance countries have fewer inspections and regulations against the misuse of 
power (Schultz et al., 1993; Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Basabbe & Ros, 2005; Hofstede, 
2001; Pillay & Dorasamy, 2010; Curtis, Conover & Chui, 2012), but none have 
focused on investigating the relationship between power distance and nepotism. 
 
In countries such as India or Indonesia where there is a high power distance, 
individuals are unlikely to challenge the power of their bosses and it would be 
highly unlikely they would bypass their chain of command (Davis & Ruhe, 2003). 
Therefore, practices such as extortion, unequal levels of compensation (Getz & 
Volkema, 2001) and nepotism are more likely to exist. In contrast, in countries 
such as Denmark or Finland where power distance is small, and society is more 
equal, there is less corruption, and anyone can challenge powerholders or the 
chain of command (Francesco & Gold, 1998). 
 
Gomez-Mejia, Balkin and Cardy (1998) stipulated that low power distance 
societies are more likely to have egalitarian-based systems in place; therefore, 
selection would be based on merit, not nepotistic connections, and nepotism on 





societies that have a large power distance, which often also coincides with a more 
collectivistic or relationship-based culture (Pillay & Dorasamy 2010), the primary 
means for getting ahead or getting things done lies in the ability to network. Thus, 
power relations are manifested in, and perpetuate through personal and family 
networks (Hooker, 2009). In this view, nepotistic appointments serve to reinforce 
inequality and the concentration of privilege and wealth amongst powerful ‘elites’ 
(Guhan & Samuel, 1997; Mills, 1956). 
 
The notion of dependence on those in authority can lead individuals with 
low power/status to subscribe to hierarchical differentiation and refrain from 
questioning leaders’ decisions even if the latter may be unethical (Hofstede, 
 
1983). In contrast, individuals in authority with high power/status would be free 
to act nepotistically for the benefit of relatives knowing they would not be 
challenged (Basabe & Ros, 2005; Deschepper et al., 2008). For example, the very 
powerful ex-Indonesian president, Suharto, appointed his submissive brother-in-
law to public office who in turn proceeded to appoint other members of the 
Suharto family and their friends, some of whom were widely considered to be 
incompetent to hold public office or carry out contracts awarded to them for 
public services (Robertson-Snape, 1999). However, due to the level of power and 
authority commanded by President Suharto and his family, his people were 





Hofstede’s power distance dimension is related to the extent to which 
 
national cultures tolerate and buy into the unequal distribution of power in their 
society, as illustrated by the example of the Indonesian president, Suharto. In 
general, it relates to inequality (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005) and the 
stratification between high and low status individuals (Basabe & Ros, 2005). 
Reviews of cross-cultural studies carried out by Triandis et al. (1988) and Basabe 
and Ros (2005) suggest collectivistic societies have more social and economic 
inequality and power differentials are more acceptable and considered to be 
legitimate. 
 
Eastern countries are often characterised by a greater prevalence of high-
power distance, whereas Western countries are characterised by low power 
distance (Erez ,1994; Triandis, 1994). Banuri and Eckel (2012) suggested that 
collectivist cultures have their moral values and beliefs rooted in the betterment 
of their in-group. However, power distance is also linked to unethical behaviour 
and practices (Khatri, 2009), which again leads to the prediction that nepotistic 
practices are more prevalent in high power distance settings, when compared to 
low power distance settings. This is consistent with Bellow’s (2003) supposition 
that nepotism occurs far more frequently in less developed nations and societies, 




According to Khare (1999), the decision-making process in Indian organisations 
(which are characterised by high power distance) is hierarchical and dominated 
by superiors; those in position of authority make decisions without consulting 
with their subordinates. Communication between bosses and subordinates is 
often done via formal methods only. As a result, there is little to no informal 
interaction between superiors and subordinates because of hierarchical 
structures. In contrast, in low power distance organisations superiors may seek 
out their subordinates’ views and input before making a decision, as the 
likelihood of subordinates resisting new decisions without consultation is high 
(Brockner et al., 2001). 
 
Hierarchical structures facilitate top-down decision-making, where power-
holders are free to make important decisions and appoint employees with little 
oversight or involvement from employees. These top-down decisions are less likely 
to be merit based and more likely to involve nepotistic practices. For example, 
qualitative research suggests that family-owned businesses in Pakistan—a high 
power distance culture—have no human resource department, and business owners 
don’t see the need for it as those in senior positions appoint relatives to positions 
and award promotions based on their level of connection to the founder or the 
general managers (Mangi, Shah & Ghumro, 2012). Therefore, the closer the 
connection to the founder, the higher the position you would be appointed too 
(Afzal, Khan & Ali, 2009). This practice maintains existing hierarchical structures, and 
the founder or mangers often regard their business as their fiefdom (Mangi, Shah, & 





promoted are happy to maintain the status quo; therefore those in authority are 
unchallenged, and the nepotistic hierarchal gap between low level employees 
and management remains. 
1.4.2.3. Social Dominance Theory 
Social Dominance Theory (SDT) describes the processes that contribute to 
varying forms of group-based oppression (Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 
2001). According to SDT group-based oppression (e.g. group-based discrimination, 
racism, sexism, classism, ethnocentrism) originates from a tendency create and 
maintain group based hierarchy (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar & Levin, 2004).  
Social Dominance theory (SDT) provides an account for why people in 
societies organise themselves in group-based hierarchies and it explores the 
differences between dominant groups and subordinate groups in social 
structures.  SDT provides a good framework from which we can better understand 
the reasons why people endorse ideologies like nepotism, which can be classified 
as a form of discrimination and a factor that reinforces inequalities (Wong & 
Kleiner, 1994). 
SDT highlights that people perceive and treat members of a dominant 
group differently compared to members of a subordinate group. Compared to 
members of subordinate groups, members of dominant groups are more likely to 
have higher degrees of decision-making power, and are more likely to differ in 
their endorsement of inequality (Pratto et al., 2000; Robertson-Snape, 1999; 
Sidanius et al., 2004).  
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Social Dominance Theory implies that group-based hierarchy (in-group 
versus out-group) or group discrimination are more likely to operate 
systematically because of hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and forces (Sidanius et 
al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Nepotism can be one such force as inter-
generational jobs (such as those in the military or family firms) are passed from 
one (dominant group) family member to the next, which is likely reinforced by 
system justifying beliefs and ideologies (Mills, 1956; Luo, 2002; Sidanius et al., 
2004).  
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) indicates the extent to which people 
accept and endorse activities, systems, and processes that legitimize and 
reinforce inequality and power differences (Sidanius et al., 2004). Consequently, 
SDO is typically conceptualised as a disposition or enduring ideology that 
individuals possess (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, 
& Levin, 2006). SDO encapsulates the view that we live in a competitive world 
where the strong deserve to win (Duckitt, 2009). In a given society or cultural 
setting, some individuals endorse hierarchical differentiation more than others, 
and this influences the extent to which individuals accept or reject policies and 
procedures that contribute to group differentiation (e.g., Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 
2011; Pratto et al., 1994; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). For example, 
people who endorse SDO are more likely to purposefully discriminate against out-
group members whilst ensuring in-group members have the best outcome and 
remain in a dominant position (e.g., Pratto et al., 2006). 
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Individuals who endorse SDO are more likely to perceive their in-group superior to 
out-groups (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Chiao, Mathur, Harada, & Lipke 2009). Perhaps, 
not surprisingly, SDO predicts variations in prejudice (Kteily, Sidanius & Levin, 
2011), as well as individuals’ choices in relation to equality in organisational 
settings (Haley & Sidanius, 2005), the persecution of under privileged, minority 
groups (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius et al., 2015; Thomsen, Green & 
Sidanius, 2008), and support for social welfare and affirmative action (Federico & 
Sidanius, 2002; Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDO encapsulates 
support for high status groups that are controlling and dominating over low status 
groups, and individuals who support high status groups are more likely to display 
support for beliefs that maintain inequality amongst groups (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius 
& Levin, 2006). Unlike individuals who endorse SDO, individuals who exhibit low 
SDO are more inclined to favour policies and procedures aimed at fostering 
equality and reducing inequality (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994). 
 
Both SDO and nepotism give rise to group-based collective processes; they 
are both vehicles for promoting hierarchy, and for perpetuating power 
inequalities through the preservation of hierarchies within organisations. It 
therefore stands to reason that individuals who gravitate to having higher levels 
of SDO are more likely endorse nepotism because relatives are perceived as more 
deserving and as belonging to a more elite, superior in-group. Individuals who 
endorse SDO are also more inclined to prefer policies and practices that create 
social stratification. Because SDO is an ideological variable, and ideologies tend to 





Doescher, 2010), individuals appointed through nepotism may themselves be 
more likely to endorse SDO. In a similar vein, individuals who possess nepotistic 
tendencies are more likely to be higher in the hierarchy order based on their kin 
connection (for example a first born son would be seen higher in the hierarchy 
order than a cousin), and this would afford them greater control over others and 
entitle them to a higher status (Rosenblatt et al., 2010). In contrast, subordinates 
without strong ties are less likely to be nepotistic because they do not have the 
same power striving and dominance traits. In this view, SDO and the endorsement 
of nepotism are presumably connected and positively correlate with each other 
as they both are focused on maintaining hierarchies and maintaining the status 
quo. This will be explored within the remit of this thesis through empirical studies. 
 
Whilst there is no direct evidence that nepotism is linked to constructs such 
as SDO and power distance, circumstantial evidence underscores the importance 
of power dynamics. Padgett and Morris (2005) suggested family-owned firms 
employ nepotistic practices in order to maintain control and ownership of their 
business. Anecdotal evidence linking nepotism to powerful groups or individuals, 
who pass on their wealth and influence through family generations abounds. 
American presidents (Bush, Addams, and Clinton) are a point in case, and so are 
firms such as Ford, Johnson & Johnson, Wal-Mart, BSky B, where it is common 






It has been suggested that nepotism can be a strategic manoeuvre to 
maintain control, whilst distributing wealth and stakeholder status among family 
members (Sidani & Thornberry, 2013), providing long term stability for the family 
and ultimately keeping power and influence within the family (Cucculelli, 2013), 
as illustrated by the Trumps in America today. Wal-Mart CEO, John Walton, 
described his company as a trust or legacy designed to provide long term benefits 
and opportunities for his family (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Similarly, the 
forefather of the famous Rothschild family, who amounted their fortune through 
international financing, stipulated rules in his will that would nepotistically tie his 
family to his business for the foreseeable future. These rules included that the 
family was to maintain control of the business by keeping it within family hands; 
all key positions were to be held by male members of the family only, and the 
family had to inter-marry either their first or second cousin to keep it all in the 
bloodlines. He was not concerned about meritocracy but more about legacy 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Niall, 1998). The family remains one of the wealthiest 




1.4.2.4. The importance of meritocracy and opportunism 
 
The principle or ideal of meritocracy is that only individuals with a 
proven level of competency are rewarded. Thus, an unbiased system is 






1994). In many individualistic societies where people attach prestige and status to 
personal achievements, merit is meant to dictate hiring and promotion decisions 
(Bauernschuster, Falck, Gold, & Heblich, 2012; Kyriacou, 2016; Tanzi, 1994). 
 
Individuals with a strong preference for endorsing nepotism could be perceived 
as violating the merit principles in these cultural settings (Bellow, 2003; Son Hing, 
Bobocel, Zanna, Garcia, Gee, & Orazietti, 2011). 
 
Affirmative action, and preferential treatment originating from nepotism, 
may result in the hiring or promotion of less qualified or competent individuals 
over more qualified individuals (Scoppa, 2009). Relatedly, nepotism may 
 
be perceived as a violation of principles of fairness, infringing on the level of 
equality candidates may be expecting. For example, President Bush Jnr set the 
standard for official nepotism by appointing members of his family and 
friends who appeared to have some level of qualification, but the overriding 
factor in getting the job appeared to be family ties (Bellow, 2003). 
 
Bellow (2003) controversially suggested that the American population 
appears to be more comfortable with nepotism than egalitarian principles; this 
however seems to go against common depictions of American society as an 
individualist, meritocratic nation. Nepotism, he added, challenges the view of 
America’s meritocratic ideal. Nevertheless, in practice it would seem that 
Americans are just as inclined to confer advantages to those who have been born 





owned firms account for a large percentage of American businesses and strong 
family tradition are also very much integral to the national fabric of the 
American society (Arasli, Bavik, & Ekiz, 2006; Evans, 1995). 
 
It has been argued that nepotistic recruitment typically involves some level 
of formality such as the completion of entry exams; even though the appointment 
of individuals with nepotistic ties is often a given (Boje, 1991; Evans, 1992, 1995). 
Rauch and Evans (2000) suggested that in countries with a high prevalence of 
nepotism, meritocratic practices such as exams and other entrance qualifications 
are poorly monitored and often not used to select candidates with relevant 
experience. These qualifications can also act as barriers to entry for qualified 
outsiders because they shield incumbent family members from competition 
(Williamson, 1985). 
 
Endorsing nepotism may in itself affect the extent to which people associate 
nepotism with merit. Son Hing, Bobocel and Zanna (2002) suggested that people 
who are more inclined to violate merit based principles are more likely to indulge 
in nepotistic practices because they perceive the beneficiaries of nepotistic hiring 
as the most qualified or competent people. Thus, subjectively, the endorsement 
of nepotism may be compatible with the endorsement of meritocratic beliefs, and 
individuals may be able to hold both sets of beliefs or worldviews without 
experiencing any cognitive inconsistency. Consequently, empirical studies are 





principles also tend to reject nepotistic principles and practices, and vice versa. 
 
Studies 1 and 2 presented in Chapter 2 were designed with this goal in mind. 
 
In many cultures, reciprocity and nepotism go hand in hand; employers 
are more inclined to base their work-related choices and decisions around the 
family, and they expect favours to be ‘reciprocated’ as their intention is to 
provide a good quality of life for their family and have a good network they can 
depend on (Davila & Elvira, 2005; Wated & Sanchez, 2015). Consequently, people 
may endorse nepotism more to the extent that they expect to gain benefits, 
either for themselves or their families. For instance, Popezyk (2017) proposed 
that in family run firms a form of social exchange occurs whereby interactions 
are based on the norm of reciprocity. Reciprocal nepotism implies extending 
favours with the recipient accepting the moral obligation of returning the favour 
at some point in the future (Kragh, 2012). 
 
Opportunism is another factor that can play a role in nepotistic hiring; for 
example when opportunities arise in family run firms there is a greater likelihood 
that family members, especially those within close social distance, will fill the 
required positions (Dyer, 2006). For instance, the retirement of parents in a family 
firm subsequently leads to their children taking on leadership roles with the 
organisation (Jones et al., 2008). Further anecdotal evidence provided suggests 
that parents use their position of authority to nepotistically provide opportunities 





Hooft & Stout, 2012). However, the choice to make use of the said opportunities’ 
rests with the children. There are valid reasons children may accept such 
opportunities put forth by their parents: financial gains, to maintain a brand name, 
or to contribute to the long-term stability for the family (Cucculelli, 2013; Sidani & 
Thornberry, 2013). There is indirect evidence to support such a transactional or 
opportunistic view of nepotism, but direct empirical evidence is scant. In Chapter 





1.5. Consequences of nepotism 
 
1.5.1. Current state of knowledge 
 
 
Nepotism is often perceived negatively, at least in Western cultural 
settings. In the 60’s, Harvard Business Review (1965) sampled a population of 
approximately 2,700 businessmen and reported that a large percentage (> 60%) 
of their participants perceived nepotism to be negative. Consistent with those 
findings, almost forty years later Slack (2001) reported nepotism was still deemed 
undesirable. People’s negative perception of nepotism are deeply rooted in their 
personal belief that nepotism opposes values such as egalitarianism, meritocracy 
and self-reliance. Specifically, nepotism is viewed to be a form of privilege for 
those with family and social connections in places of power. The beneficiaries of 
nepotism are perceived to advance their career not because of individual merit 
but based on family connections (Bellow, 2003). In these circumstances when the 
emphasis is placed on factors other than merit or competency, nepotism is 
perceived as unfair and unreasonable (Padgett & Morris, 2005). Over the 
centuries, formally or informally nepotism has played a role in hiring practice in 
industry, arts, politics and sports, but relatively little empirical research has been 
conducted to understand the actual consequences of nepotism and its effects on 
the workforce (Jones et al., 2008; Jones, 2012; Padgett & Morris, 2005; Vinton, 
1998). The following sections summarise what we know about the implications of 








1.5.1.1. Organisation level consequences 
 
In labour markets, nepotism can lead to the selection of inefficient personnel 
and a decline in the performance of firms (e.g. Abdalla et al., 1998; Arasli et al., 2015; 
Jones, 2012). For example, nepotistic practices can result in family problems 
becoming business problems, to the detriment of organisations (Becker 
 
& Gerhart, 1996; Ford & McLaughlin, 1986; Ichniowski, 1988; Mulder, 2012). 
However, contrasting evidence indicates that nepotism within family run firms 
may have little effect on organisational performance and output (Dyer, 2006). 
Vinton (1998) argues that there are a great number of anecdotal articles relating 
to family-owned business which deem nepotism more (Bellow, 2003) or less 
favourable (Danco, 1982; Molofsky, 1998; Nelton, 1998). 
 
Alcorn (1982) suggested that family firms benefit from hiring relatives during 
founding years when a business is being established, as relatives are more willing 
to provide reliable manpower at nominal rates of pay to get the business off the 
ground. However, nepotistic practices can also be detrimental for the image of 
organisations, as illustrated by Mutlu (2000) who examined nepotism in the police 
force in Turkey. The author administered a questionnaire to police chiefs, which 
revealed that appointments and promotions were made, and dominated by, the 
use of personal networks. Mutlu argues that there was also evidence of political 





mistrusting the police. However, these effects may not be universal as it is also 
conceivable that nepotism can enhance the image of (some) organisations by 
providing a common identity and uniqueness (cf. Jones, 2012). 
 
Ponzo and Scoppa (2010) drew on data provided by the Bank of Italy. Their 
results showed that informal networks are commonly used in low-skilled jobs, 
small firms, and low-tech companies where formal education is perhaps not as 
important when assessing an individual level of performance or productivity. 
Companies that hire from their employee pool of informal networks save on 
recruitment and selection cost unlike companies who go through the ‘formal’ 
route of advertising and enlisting recruitment agencies. Conversely, informal 
networks are generally used less in high-skilled professions that require highly 
educated workers. Importantly, their data suggested that the stronger family ties 
are, the greater the prevalence of favouritism, and the lower levels of job 
productivity. 
 
An empirical study by Spranger et al. (2012) in family-owned businesses 
suggested that non-family members can perceive nepotism to be unfair and unjust 
and this can produce counterproductive behaviours and higher turnover— 
outcomes that are detrimental for organisations. In their study, family members’ 
perceptions of nepotism differed from non-family members’ perceptions, as 
nepotistic individuals believed they were entitled to benefit from their family 





firms and areas such as farming appear to be more accepted by both nepotistic 
and non-nepotistic employees. In particular small companies remotely located are 
more likely to hire relatives due to their restricted labour market, and this 
appears to have no detrimental impact on these organisations (Vinton, 1998). 
 
All in all, there is significant degree of variability in the current evidence 
base regarding the consequences of nepotism for organisations. Whilst some 
studies suggest that nepotism may have advantages as a recruitment ‘tool’, 
with no allied detrimental impact on organisational performance and output, 
other studies suggest that there may be drawbacks for employee satisfaction 
and an organisation’s reputation. As discussed below, in the present thesis I 
argue that the consequences of nepotism depend to a large extent on the 
qualifications of those who are hired and/or promoted through nepotistic 




1.5.1.2. Individual level consequences 
 
Arasli and Tumer (2008) and Scoppa (2009) noted that there is a paucity of 
empirical work on the direct effects of nepotism on the nepot themselves. Only a 
handful of empirical studies have examined the effects of nepotism in workplaces 
(Abdalla et al., 1998; Arasli et al., 2015; Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Ford & McLaughlin, 
1986; Lentz & Laband, 1990; Laband & Lentz, 1992; Laker & Williams, 2003; 





(2003) looked at the relationship between working with relatives and levels of 
job satisfaction in a large Latin American family-controlled bank. An internal audit 
of this bank in 1998 suggested that 25% of their employees were related to each 
other (this was before the introduction of a strict anti-nepotism policy). Laker and 
Williams (2003) found that nepotism was associated with employee 
dissatisfaction and lower commitment. 
 
Ichniowski (1988) and Ford and McLaughlin (1986) argued that nepotism 
has a negative impact on the morale of those people who are in position of 
authority over relations of high-level executives, fellow employees, as well as 
employees who perceive that a nepotistic relative were unjustifiably given a 
promotions or reward. By the same token, nepotism may actually be a strain for 
nepots as they may have a level of uncertainty if their hiring, promotion, or 
allocation of rewards were based on their actual performance or based on their 
family connections (Jones, 2012). Also, empirical studies show that permitting 
nepotism can expose non-nepotistic employees to issues arising from family 
conflicts, sibling rivalry, disagreements over managerial succession, and a 
general conflation of business and personal family affairs in the workplace 
(Abdalla et al., 1998; Arasli et al., 2015; Mulder, 2012). 
 
Arasli and Tumer (2008) reported that perceived nepotism over time may 
lead to increased job stress amongst employees due to the consequences of 





connections. They empirically demonstrated that amongst under-qualified family 
members, nepotistic hiring leads to lower job satisfaction, increased turnover and 
stress, poorer psychological health and lower employee work attitudes and 
morale. Jones et al.’s (2008) review of nepotistic literature added 
 
to Arasli and Tumer’s (2008) findings, suggesting that individuals hired through 
nepotistic practices are more likely to face negative reactions from their co-
workers, which may invariably lead to reduced psychological well-being. 
Anecdotal evidence provided by Kiechel (1984) suggests that if the practice of 
nepotism is prevalent but clandestine; it can sometimes be good, but mostly bad 
and generally more difficult on the unqualified family member than anyone else. 
Further anecdotal evidence by Lansberg (1983) suggests that when nepots lack 
adequate qualifications, the values, culture and principles of the family and that 
of the business are in conflict (see also Burkart, Panuszi & Shliefer, 2003). The 
expectation to hire family members can put pressure on organisational decision-
makers who are aware they may be hiring an incompetent family member, and 
this may ultimately affect the productivity of the business, or cause discord within 
the family if they do not hire the family member (Lansberg, 1983). In the case of 
sports, it has been argued that people associate certain traits or behaviours with a 
family name, which creates the expectation that family members will perform in 





From the above examples, nepotism may have been deemed a profitable 
or favourable strategy, when jobs were transmitted from parents to children, or 
children were employed in the same firm as their parents, or if one of the most 
qualified nepots were hired. However, nepots themselves can experience 
negative consequences such as lower job satisfaction, poorer psychological well-
being, lower morale, and lower job commitment. They may also experience strain 




1.5.2. Unanswered questions 
 
Laker and Williams’ (2003) remark that most nepotism studies are 
anecdotal and more empirical studies are needed to determine the influence of 
nepotism on employees and organisations still holds to this date. One of the 
latest pieces of research on nepotistic hiring was carried out by Darioly and Riggio 
 
(2014). Using simulated hiring scenarios, the authors showed that people 
perceive qualified nepotistic hires in the organisation negatively, irrespective of 
the level of qualification of the nepots. This may be due to perception of injustice 
and incompetence. The author suggested lay people do not distinguish between 
qualified and unqualified nepotistic employees, and as a result the perception of 
nepotism violates perceptions of meritocracy and fairness. Part of this thesis 





empirical studies within an organisation. This aims to fill a gap in the literature 




1.5.2.1. The drawbacks of unqualified nepotistic 
 
Hernandez and Page’s (2006) empirical study, and Khatri and Tsang’s 
(2003) review of the literature suggest that nepotism in general is associated 
with several negative outcomes for the organisation. These include lower 
organisational performance, conflicts of interest, gossip and rumours of unfair 
practices, inequality, lack of meritocratic practices by hiring and promoting 
underqualified candidates, reduced organisational diversity and a reluctance to 
change. 
 
A potential pitfall of nepotism lies in hiring less than competent individuals, 
who may not have the level of skill required to carry out the job successfully. 
Jones and Stout (2015) suggested the classic problem of nepotism is the 
competence dilemma, especially if the hiring organisation endorses the hiring of 
family members irrespective of competence levels. 
 
Competence is a combination of qualifications, knowledge, skills, traits, 
abilities, attitudes, beliefs and/or experience that employers look for in their 
employees to meet the demands of work (McClelland, 1973; Spencer & Spencer, 
2008; Stoof, Martens, Van Merrienboer & Bastiaens, 2002). According to 





individual’s ability to apply their knowledge and skills to perform an 
organisational task, as well as to demonstrate problem-solving skills and the 
ability to cope with changing demands. As such, competence is associated 
with success in relation to the requirements or work criteria set out by the 
organisation (Kurz & Bartram, 2002; Schuler & Jackson, 2008). 
 
A lack of skills, experience, understanding, and/or knowledge are 
significant barriers for individuals to function adequately and to discharge their 
work-related duties and responsibilities. Here lies the dilemma of hiring nepotistic 
unqualified individuals; they may have some level of human capital transfer, 
which is a plus, but their lack of qualification and competence (i.e., job related 
knowledge, experience and skills) implies a mis-match between the individual’s 
level of competence and the level of competency required to carry out their role. 
Consequently, hiring incompetent nepots can be seen as complicated and 
dysfunctional for the organisation creating bigger problems in the future for 
nepotistic individuals as well as the organisation (Becker, 2012; Wated &Sanchez, 
2012). 
 
Psychological well-being is dependent on ongoing feelings of competence. 
Feeling competent in one’s position suggests that underlying needs such as self-
esteem, self-confidence and self-efficacy are fulfilled (Sheldon, Ryan & Reis, 
 
1996). Bandura (1977) implied that a key determinant of psychological well-being 





and competence to achieve a task increases self-confidence, self-esteem and 
self-efficacy. Carver and Scheier (1990) and Slaven (2002) suggested that health 
benefits increase when individuals feel they are accomplishing their goals. 
 
There are many anecdotal stories of incompetent offspring’s being hired 
compared to qualified individuals but there is little quantitative or empirical 
evidence to support the crucial role of competence in contributing to the 
negative effects of nepotism (Mulder, 2012; Jones & Stout, 2015). As outlined in 
the next section, nepotism combined with high levels of competence may have a 




1.5.2.2. The benefits of hiring qualified nepots 
 
As outlined above, nepotism is often synonymous with hiring and promoting 
incompetent individuals through family connections rather than capabilities and 
education (Dickson, Niemien, & Biermeirer-Hanson, 2012). However, it is 
important to remember there may be individuals with family connection that 
may possess the appropriate education, skills, experience, and motivation to do 
the job (Jones, 2012). 
 
The advantages of hiring qualified nepotistic individuals according to an 
argument put forward by Ford and McLaughlin (1986) and Hernandez and Page 
(2006) includes the allure of working in a friendly family-type environment, having 





continuity of family-held values for customers and the community. They claim by 
hiring qualified nepotistic individuals, the organisation gains someone who 
already understands the inner working culture of the company, has the right 
person-environment fit, and someone who has the necessary skill and experience 
to meet the needs of the organisation. They continued by saying qualified 
nepotistic individuals can add value to the organisation as they already are aware 
of the culture and value in the way the company works because they have been 
around the business for many years, and their orientation and training times are 
far less than an employee who has not been in the organisation before (Van Hoof 
& Stout, 2012). 
 
Having family ties with an organisation, nepots already have established 
links with employees, and the familial connection can give an increased sense of 
commitment, loyalty and attachment to the organisation. As discussed earlier, 
hiring a qualified nepotistic individual can also reduce costs associated with 
recruitment and selection processes (Van Hoof & Stout, 2012). Moreover, Bellow 
(2003) suggested that qualified nepotistic relatives are likely to reciprocate the 
trust instilled in them. 
 
A significant concern for any employee is the levels of autonomy and control 
they have to carry out their duties. Autonomy encompasses aspects such as being 





the job. The greater an individuals’ perceptions of autonomy and control, 
the better their performance on their job (e.g., Slaven, 2002). 
 
Low levels of autonomy and control are associated with greater level of 
dependency on co-workers and superiors (Semmer, 2000). On the other hand, 
employees with a high level of competence can exert greater autonomy and thus 
perform tasks more independently, putting less pressure on co-workers and 
superiors (Aube, Rousseau, & Morin, 2007). 
 
Employees who possess the relevant skills and experience to discharge their 
duties are more likely to experience a greater level of control and autonomy in 
their working environment; conversely, employees with limited experience or 
skills are more likely to experience less autonomy and control, and as such are 
less likely to thrive in a working environment. 
 
Several studies established a positive link between autonomy and 
control and well-being (Athanasiades & Winthrop, 2007; Judge & Locke 
 
1993; Slaven, 2002). Deci and Ryan (1985) and Ryan (1995) suggested that 
autonomy plays a part in having optimal psychological well-being. Individuals 
lacking a sense of achievement may experience less satisfaction and more 
frustration in their lives which leads to poorer psychological well-being (Sheldon 
 
& Kasser, 1995; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). In contrast, individuals who possess 





autonomy and control, boosting individuals’ self-confidence, self-efficacy and 
ultimately their psychological well-being. 
 
In a study by Karasek (1979), employees with substantial job demands 
reported a decrease in their psychological well-being when they had little or no 
autonomy and control during the decision-making process. This affected the way 
they performed their duties, whereas employees with high levels of autonomy 
and control in similar situations (heavy job demands) reported that their 
psychological well-being was not greatly affected. Litt (1988) suggested that 
having control or perceived levels of control in one’s job can ameliorate poor 
psychological well-being. 
 
From the above discussion derives the prediction that qualified nepotistic 
and non-qualified nepotistic individuals differ in how much autonomy and control 
they experience in their jobs, and this can have implications for performance and 
well-being over time. Much of the literature on nepotism has focused on negative 
aspects of nepotism, often ignoring the potential importance of competence and 
qualifications, which I argue is critical to understand the consequences of 
nepotism. To address this gap, in Chapter 3 I will present studies comparing 
qualified nepotistic individuals with unqualified nepotistic individuals, as well as 
non-nepotistic individuals in terms of relevant individual and organisational 
outcomes such as how much autonomy and control people experience in their 








1.6. Summary and outlook 
 
Nepotism is a global phenomenon that can be observed in both small 
family-run firms and large multinational corporations, (Bellow, 2003; Padgett & 
Morris, 2005; Vinton, 1998). Nepotistic practices are not confined to a particular 
region and exist in first world countries as well as developing nations (Bellow, 
2003; Jones et al., 2008; Jones, 2012; Padgett & Morris, 2005; Vinton, 1998). 
Based on the literature review there appears to be a paucity of empirical research 
investigating antecedents and consequences of nepotistic practices (Padgett & 
Morris, 2005; Padgett, Padgett & Morris, 2015) and the studies that do exist often 
report conflicting findings. 
 
In this chapter, I reviewed empirical and anecdotal evidence around 
nepotistic practices and provided some examples of nepotism in high ranking 
government positions. These were not limited to micro-geographies or family-run 
firms, and ironically exist in some countries where governments have 
implemented anti-nepotism laws to stop such practices (Biswas, 2013). 
 
To increase our understanding of nepotistic practices, I investigated 
antecedents that exist on the organisational, societal and individual level. A few 
examples of organisational level antecedents included the size and location of an 
organisation (Laker & Williams, 2003; Jones et al., 2008), and whether firms are 





Pfeffer, 2005; Padgett, Padgett & Morris, 2015). Vertical collectivistic cultures and 
related socio-economic settings that use family connections were discussed as 
societal-level antecedents (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Chakrabarty, 2009; Scoppa, 
2009). At an individual level, I noted evolutionary arguments that 
 
nepotism is hardwired in our DNA (Jones, 2012). Furthermore, I discussed 
 
collectivistic values as a factor that may affect individuals’ beliefs and attitudes in 
 
relation to nepotistic practices (Wated and Sanchez, 2005; 2015). 
 
Having identified organisational, societal and individual level antecedents, I 
moved on to examine the roles of family ties, power distance, meritocracy and 
opportunism as factors that may contribute to differences in the endorsement of 
nepotistic practices. Families within collectivist societies are deemed to have 
closer family ties and are duty bound towards their families and in-group (Basabe 
 
& Ros, 2005). This tendency gives rise to favouring their kin (Wated & Sanchez, 
2015), which likely impacts the endorsement of nepotism. 
 
According to Basabe and Ros (2005), Hofstede et al. (2010) and Curtis et al. 
 
(2012), countries with high power distance are more accepting of inequality 
between its citizens. Consequently, in countries like India and Indonesia, which 
are classified as high power distance countries, individuals are likely more 
supportive of nepotistic practices. SDO is closely related to power distance; 
individuals who endorse SDO are more likely to perceive their in-group as 





discrimination towards out-group members (Kteily, Sidanius & Levin, 2011). 
People who endorse SDO also show greater support for promoting hierarchy-
enhancing policies. As such, it stands to reason that individuals who exhibit high 
levels of SDO may be more likely to endorse appointing and promoting relatives 
because they are perceived as more deserving than out-group members. In 
Chapter 2, I will present what, to my knowledge, is the first empirical evidence 
to examine the association between power distance and SDO on the one hand, 
and nepotism on the other. 
 
There is reason to assume that individuals who value merit principles are 
less likely to show a preference for endorsing nepotism (Son Hing et al., 2011; 
Bellow, 2003). Similarly, reciprocity and opportunism are two factors that go 
hand in hand with nepotism (Wated & Sanchez, 2015; Davila & Elvira, 2005). 
Reciprocity amongst family and friends can lead individuals to favour kin over 
non-kin (Bellow, 2003). Similarly, previous studies have shown that parents use 
their position of power within the organisation to obtain opportunities for their 
children (Bellow 2003; Cucculelli, 2013; Sidani & Thornberry, 2013; van Hooft & 
Stout, 2012). Consequently, reciprocity and opportunism may be important 
individual-level variables to explain variations in the endorsement of nepotism. I 
will explore these conjectures in Chapter 2. 
 
I proceeded to discuss the consequences of nepotism for both the 





as a recruitment tool, and I noted that nepotism can provide some advantages to 
the organisation. This literature also argues that nepotism may have little or no 
detrimental impact on performance and output. However, another camp in the 
literature posits that nepotism is detrimental to employee satisfaction and an 
organisation’s reputation. 
 
So far, previous empirical studies have shown that the consequences of 
nepotism for the individual are often negative; this includes having a negative 
impact on the morale of employees who supervise nepots, or colleagues who 
work alongside them (Ichniowski, 1988; Ford & McLaughlin, 1986). In addition, 
nepotism can result in non-nepotistic employees being caught up in family 
matters (Abdalla et al., 1998; Arasli et al., 2015; Becker 2012; Mulder, 2012). 
Jones (2012) suggested nepotism may also be a strain for nepots. Nepots can face 
negativity from their co-workers (Jones et al., 2008; Arasli & Tumer, 2008), which 
can have a detrimental impact on psychological well-being (Kiechel, 1984). 
 
With the above in mind, I proceeded to explore the potential moderating 
role of qualification/competence in determining whether the outcomes of 
nepotism for the individual and organisation are primarily positive or negative. 
Ford and McLaughlin (1986) and Hernandez and Page (2006) suggested that there 
are several benefits of hiring qualified nepots: a good person-fit to the 
environment, a person with an inside knowledge of the inner working of the 





added bonus of human capital transfer, a greater sense of loyalty and 
commitment, and reduced costs associated with recruiting and 
selecting candidates (van Hoof & Stout, 2012). 
 
There are drawbacks when hiring unqualified nepots; their lack of 
competence and qualifications put them at a disadvantage when compared to 
their qualified and non-nepotistic colleagues. This is because by definition they do 
not possess the necessary skills, experience and knowledge to perform tasks and 
discharge their duties. Lower levels of perceived control can put a strain on 
unqualified nepots who lack competence to meet the demands of their job. 
Consequently, unqualified nepots are more likely to experience poorer 
psychological well-being and lower levels of performance. 
 
The subsequent, empirical chapters of this thesis are organised into two 
parts. The first part, Chapter 2, focusses on individual psychological and socio-
cultural factors that predict variations in the endorsement of nepotism. Study 1 
was carried out in the UK with university students. In this study, SDO emerged as 
a reliable predictor of nepotism endorsement. Furthermore, individuals who 
perceived nepotism to be meritocratic and not violating merit principles were 
more likely to endorse nepotistic practices. Unexpectedly, I found no significant 
association between endorsement of nepotism on the one hand, and collectivism 





Study 2, a cross cultural investigation, examined the prevalence and 
endorsement of nepotism in India, USA, Greece and Trinidad. The results 
indicated that samples from collectivistic high-power distance countries 
exhibited the highest prevalence and endorsement of nepotism, and samples 
from individualistic low power distance countries, the lowest. In addition, people 
who exhibited high levels of SDO again endorsed nepotism more than people 
who exhibited low levels of SDO, presumably because nepotism contributes to 
maintaining and reinforcing existing hierarchies and inequality. Finally, individual 
differences in the value attached for family ties and utilitarian beliefs influenced 
people’s attitude towards nepotism. 
 
In the second part of this thesis, Chapter 3, I examine actual and perceived 
consequences of nepotism for both qualified and non-qualified nepots; thereby 
extending a small body of empirical evidence on the consequences of nepotism 
reviewed above (Arasli et al. 2015; Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Keles et al., 2011; Padgett 
& Morris, 2005, 2012). Study 3 was a longitudinal empirical study carried out in a 
real work setting. Data was collected from a military arm of the defence force in a 
Caribbean country. The results indicated that hiring unqualified nepotistic 
personnel had a detrimental impact on the individual and the organisation. 
However, hiring qualified nepotistic personnel had the opposite effect and was, to 
some extent, beneficial. Study 4 addressed the perceived consequences of 





indicated that employees from the nepotistic firm were perceived to be more 
committed and thought to experience greater well-being than employees in the 
non-nepotistic firm. Employees in the nepotistic firm were also perceived to have 
more autonomy and control than employees in the non-nepotistic firm. 
Importantly, the perceived consequences of nepotism were the same regardless 
of whether employees worked in an environment that favours qualified nepots, 
or an environment that favours unqualified nepots. In Chapter 4, I reflect on how 
these findings enhance our understanding of the actual and perceived 







2.1. Chapter summary 
 
This empirical chapter consists of two primary studies which explore 
antecedents of nepotism by looking at the roles of family ties, social dominance 
and power distance, as well as meritocracy and opportunism. Study 1, was 
carried out in the UK with university students. In this study, SDO emerged as a 
reliable predictor of nepotism endorsement. Unexpectedly, I found no significant 
association between endorsement of nepotism on the one hand, and proxies for 
opportunism (Machiavellianism), family ties (collectivism), and meritocratic 
ideologies (system justification) on the other. In Study 2, a cross cultural 
investigation, I examined the prevalence and endorsement of nepotism in India, 
USA, Greece and Trinidad. The results indicated that samples from collectivistic 
high-power distance countries exhibited the highest prevalence and 
endorsement of nepotism, and samples from individualistic low power distance 
countries the lowest. In addition, people who exhibited high levels of SDO again 
endorsed nepotism more than people who exhibited low levels of SDO. Finally, 
individual differences in the value attached to family ties, meritocratic ideologies, 
and utilitarian beliefs influenced people’s attitude towards nepotism. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how the present empirical findings tie in, and 





2.2. Studies overview 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to address several gaps in our 
understanding of factors that lead individuals to endorse nepotistic practices. 
Chapter 1 identified family ties, power distance and social dominance, and 
meritocracy and opportunism as factors that may impact the prevalence of, 
and people’s attitudes of, nepotism. Studies 1 and 2 provide an empirical test 
of the assumption that these constructs serve as antecedents of nepotism. 
 
In Study 1, Machiavellianism was used as a proxy for self-enhancement 
motives (i.e., opportunism) to see whether people who score high on 
Machiavellianism would be more inclined to endorse nepotism than people who 
score low on Machiavellianism. Individuals with high Machiavellianism traits are 
manipulative, self-centred and happy to indulge in unethical decision making to 
advance their own position (e.g., Zheng et al., 2017). I also measured System 
Justification as an ideological belief system that correlates strongly with the 
tendency to endorse meritocratic principles (in the UK, where Study 1 was 
conducted). In Study 2, I draw on more direct measures of people’s motives for 
endorsing nepotism, and I examine those motives in conjunction with variations 
in cultural settings. 
 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) plays a major role in this thesis. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, SDO is closely related to power distance and reflects the 





the central role that SDO plays for the current thesis, this variable was included in 




2.3. Study 1 
 
The aim of Study 1 was to provide some initial evidence for psychological 
constructs that serve as individual-level predictors of nepotism. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the extent to which people endorse nepotism may be related to the 
extent to which people endorse merit-based principles (Jones et al., 2008); those 
who endorse meritocracy are less likely to endorse nepotistic practices. 
 
In Study 1, I examined system justification as a proxy for the endorsement 
of meritocratic principles. System justification describes people’s perception that 
the status quo in the current social system is generally fair, just and legal (e.g., 
Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost et al., 2001; Kay & Jost, 2003). This ideology 
helps us to understand how people come to understand and accept the social 
structure they live in (e.g., Jost and Hunyady 2005). System justification beliefs 
suggest that individuals are inclined to justify and rationalize their current 
socioeconomic, socio-political system as legitimate and fair so as to justify the 
status quo (e.g., Kay & Jost 2003). In Anglo-American cultural settings, system 
justification beliefs correlate with the belief that the social and economic system 
is meritocratic, and that people can achieve social mobility through hard work 





Social dominance orientation (SDO) can also serve as a system-justifying 
 
belief: high status, wealthy, powerful individuals are perceived as more deserving 
 
of their rewards; poor individuals deserve their poverty due to their lack of hard 
 
work. This suggests individuals who are more prone to endorse social 
 
stratification and group-based dominance, that is, individuals with high SDO 
 
traits, are more likely to endorse ideologies connected to merit (i.e, belief in a just 
 
world and protestant work ethics). However, Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, and 
 
McBride (2007) found that system justification was inversely correlated with SDO 
 
Individuals with a strong preference for endorsing nepotism could be perceived as 
 
offering preferential treatment to their family, and therefore violating the merit 
 
principles in Western cultures (e.g Son Hing et al, 2011). In turn, individuals who 
 
display high system justification traits are more likely to oppose the endorsement 
 
of nepotism, as system justification has a negative effect on nepotistic attitudes 
 
and behaviour. The relationship between meritocracy and nepotism, mirrors that 
of system justification and  the endorsement of nepotism in that individuals who 
endorse meritocracy  are less likely to endorse nepotism as such meritocracy has 
a negative impact on nepotistic behaviour. System justification and meritocracy  
were suitably matched for the purpose of this study   this was the reason for using 
this scale. 
 
In the present study, the Machiavellianism scale was used as a proxy for 
individual differences in the tendency to seek out opportunities to get ahead. 
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Individuals with Machiavellianism trait tend to be forward planners; they build 
coalitions with people for their self-advancement, and they are motivated by 
material gains (e.g., Barber, 1998; Jones & Paulhus, 2011). They are not impulsive 
individuals; they carefully strategize their moves. Their reputation is paramount, 
so they generally avoid manipulating family members (Barber, 1998), 
ordisplaying any behavioural abnormalities that could harm their reputation. 
As such, Machiavellianism can be summed up as individuals who are callous, 
strategically calculative, and use whatever is at their disposal to manipulate 
others for personal gain (e.g., Jones & Paulhus, 2011; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). 
Machiavellian individuals’ career choices are motivated by financial gains and 
their main focus is getting ahead. 
 
Given that Machiavellian individuals are primarily concerned with seeking 
opportunities for self-advancement, it seems reasonable to expect that these 
individuals would be likely to endorse nepotism, if not for their family, but for 
themselves and self-promotion. This would be consistent with the observation 
that people with Machiavellian traits tend to exploit interpersonal relationships, 
and they are happy to bend rules for their own benefit (e.g., Jones & Paulhus, 
2014). Mach’s love of money, power and self-advancement are key elements to 
them employing unethical behaviours to achieve their goals (Tang & Liu, 2012). 
In the process they form strong alliances with other self-minded individuals to 
whom they are connected through reciprocity of favours. 
 
Machs are more likely to agree with questionable workplace behaviour which to 
some may seem to be unethical (such as nepotism) as long as it benefits their 
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interest. As such, they tend to have a negative view of organisational or corporate 
social responsibility (e.g. Mudrack & Mason, 1995). Machs commonly embrace 
politics and are happy to yield their power over others for their own purposes 
(e.g., Deluga 2001). All this suggests that Machs should be more likely to endorse 
nepotism for their own self-interest. 
 
In sum, in Study 1, I examine the extent to which individual differences in 
SDO, collectivism, Machiavellianism, and system justifying ideologies predict 
individual differences in the endorsement of nepotistic practices. I expected SDO, 
collectivism, and Machiavellianism to be positively associated, and system 






2.3.1.1. Participants and design 
 
 
Participants were all students from the University of Kent, UK, who 
participated in exchange for course credit. Two hundred and twenty-one (184 
females; Mage = 19.97, SDage = 4.61) participants completed this correlational 




2.3.1.2. Procedure and materials 
 
The data collected for this research was part of mass-test carried out at the 
start of the academic year. Participants were advised to complete the survey on a 
laptop or desktop but not on a mobile or tablet. Participants were informed when 
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responding to the survey that all (anonymous) data supplied would be used and 
stored as part of a data repository held by the University of Kent. 
Social Dominance Orientation. A short measure taken from Pratto et al. 
(1994) was used to measure individual differences in SDO. The scale included 
eight items such as ‘An ideal society requires some groups to be on the top and 
others to be on the bottom’ (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), This SDO  
scale was used in this study as it proved to be very robust with a Cronbach alpha 
of  .68 and  measuring the variables we were investigating within this thesis . 
 
Machiavellianism. A measure of Machiavellianism derived from Jones and 
Paulhus’s (2013) Short Dark Triad scale (SD3) of which 9 items assessed individual 
differences in Machiavellianism. Participants responded to items such as ‘I like to 
use clever manipulation to get my way’ (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree). 
 
Collectivism (vs. individualism). This measure was taken from Triandis and 
 
Gelfand (1998). The 16-item scale consisted of four items which measured 
 
horizontal individualism (e.g., ‘I would rather depend on myself than others’), four 
 
items measuring vertical individualism (e.g., ‘It is important that I do a better job 
 
than others‘), four items measuring horizontal collectivism (e.g., ‘If a co-worker 
 
gets a prize, I would feel proud‘), and finally four items measuring vertical 
 
collectivism (e.g., ‘It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to 
 
sacrifice what I want’). All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
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 System justification. A measure by Jost and Kay (2003) was used to 
understand participants’ perception of fairness, legitimacy and justifiability of 
the current social system in Great Britain. All 8 items were adapted for 
participants in Britain (e.g., ‘In general the British political system operates as it 
should’). All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1= strongly agree to 7= strongly 
disagree). 
Nepotism endorsement. Based on the literature review there were no 
measures, tools or scales looking at nepotism endorsement, therefore this new 
measure was developed specifically for the purpose of the present research. 
Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with 
the practice of nepotism on two items that read, ‘Favouring relatives of 
members of an organisation over other individuals who do not have any family 
ties’ and ‘Using one’s family connections to employ someone or advance 
someone’s career’. Both items were rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly 





















2.3.2.1. Data preparation 
 
 
I collapsed scale items to create single indices of SDO (α = .68, M = 24.08, 
SD = 6.62), Machiavellianism (α = .77, M = 36.25, SD = 8.50), system justification 
(α = .79, M = 34.29, SD = 7.23), and nepotism endorsement (α = .79, M = 6.13, SD 
 
2.63). I also created composites of collectivism (α = .77, M = 36.43, SD = 5.29) and 
individualism (α = .72, M = 31.47, SD = 5.75), and subtracted the latter scores 
from the former scores to create a single index of collectivism (vs. individualism) 
(M = 4.96, SD = -.46). 
 
2.3.2.2. Main analysis 
 
At first, I conducted a Pearson correlation analyses amongst all study 
 
variables. As shown in Table 1.1, individual differences in the endorsement of 
 
nepotism correlated positively with individual differences in SDO (r = .256, p < 
 
.001), and negatively with System Justification (r = -.153, p = .023), as expected. 
 
However, contrary to predictions, correlations with Machiavellianism (r = .117, p 
= 
 




Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α), Correlations, means and standard deviations   
  1 2 3 4 5 
 1. Nepotism endorsement (.78) .117 .003 .256** -.153* 
 2. Machiavellianism - (.77) -.082 .320** .009 
3. Collectivism (vs. individualism) - - (.73) -.154* .139* 
4. SDO - - - (.68) -.201** 
5. System justification - - - - (.79) 
 Mean 6.13 36.25 4.56 24.08 34.29 
 SD 2.63 8.50 0.66 6.62 7.23 








Table 1.1 also shows a number of significant correlations between 
 
Machiavellianism, collectivism (vs. individualism), SDO, and system justification. I 
 
proceeded to regress nepotism endorsement on these predictor variables to 
 
examine unique associations with the outcome measure. The regression 
 
explained 11% of the variance in nepotism endorsement, which was significant, 
F(11,209) = 2.23, p = .014. However, as shown in Table 1.2, SDO emerged as the 
only significant predictor of nepotism endorsement, B = 0.32, t(209) = 2.66, p 
=.008. This suggests that the significant association between nepotism 
endorsement and system justification observed when looking at zero-order 
correlations may have derived from the (negative) association between system 








Regression analysis predicting variations in nepotism endorsement   
 B SE t P 95% CI 
 (Constant) 1.66 1.21 1.38 .171  
 Machiavellianism .000 .119 .000 .999 -.234, .234 
 Collectivism (vs. .099 .146 .679 .498 -.189, .388 
 individualism)      
 System Justification -.144 .010 -1.46 .145 -0.34, 0.50 













This Study is the first to empirically examine intra-individual psychological 
 
constructs as predictors of nepotism endorsement. Study 1 revealed an 
 
association between SDO and nepotism endorsement — the more individuals 
 
subscribed to SDO ideologies, the more they favoured nepotistic practices. This 
 
finding is consistent with previous studies that show SDO is associated with 
 
support of group hierarchy, inequality, and discrimination against out group 
members (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study linking SDO with nepotism endorsement, so 
these findings provide a new understanding of why some people endorse 
nepotism more than others. 
 
The present study examined Machiavellianism to capture individual-
differences in the extent to which people are concerned with seeking 
opportunities for self-advancement. I reasoned that this trait would be associated 
with greater endorsement of nepotism. However, this prediction was not 
confirmed as I failed to observe a significant relationship between 
Machiavellianism and nepotism endorsement. It is possible that participants 
scoring high (vs. low) on Machiavellianism did not make the connection between 
nepotism and opportunities for personal advancement. In the next study, I seek 
to overcome this limitation by incorporating a more direct measure of 
transactional or opportunistic views of nepotism. 
 
Individual differences in collectivism (vs. individualism) also showed no 
significant association with nepotism endorsement. This seems inconsistent with 
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the notion that support for nepotistic practices increases to the extent that 
people value family ties. It is possible that collectivism is too broad of a construct 
and more direct measures of the extent to which nepotism is endorsed due to 
bringing benefits for family members are needed. Finally, system justification 
shared a negative zero-order correlation with nepotism endorsement. On the face 
of it, this was predicted as beliefs that the system is unbiased, and fair should be 
associated with meritocratic beliefs in a political and economic setting such as the 
United Kingdom. However, the association between system justification and 
nepotism endorsement vanished when controlling for variations in SDO; perhaps as 
a reflection of the extent to which system justification encapsulates egalitarian 
beliefs in a UK setting. In my next study, my intention is to provide more direct 
evidence for the role of meritocracy beliefs in determining the extent to which 




2.4. Study 2 
 
Study 2, a cross-cultural investigation, examined the prevalence and 
endorsement of nepotistic practices in India, USA, Greece and Trinidad. I 
conducted Study 2 in these countries because they vary both in collectivism and 
power distance. Nepotism is ingrained in culture as suggested by Bellow (2003); 
therefore, it seems logical to examine variations in nepotism between countries 
that differ on relevant cultural dimensions. Drawing on Hofstede and 
colleagues’ cross-cultural studies (Hofstede, 2011; Hofstede & Bond, 1984, De 
Mooij, & Hofstede, 2011), I predicted that in a collectivistic, high power distance 
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country distance such as India, nepotism would be widespread and be endorsed 
more than in a more individualistic, low power distance country such as the 
USA. In contrasts, Trinidad and Greece—both collectivistic countries with 
intermediate levels of power distances—would fall in between India and the 
USA in terms of the prevalence of nepotism and its endorsement. 
 
Of course, nepotism can also be found in individualist societies like America. 
Therefore, it is important to examine individual-level predictors along-side 
country-level variables to examine factors that give rise to nepotism 
endorsement. Building on Study 1, and in keeping with the conceptual 
framework outlined in the previous chapter, in the present study I examined the 
importance of family ties alongside variations in SDO, meritocratic beliefs, and 
opportunisms as potential predictors of nepotism endorsement. 
 
I also sought to gain a fuller understanding of people’s perceptions of 
nepotism. In particular, I measured the extent to which nepotism was perceived 
to be fair, efficacious in hiring and promotion decision, alongside normative 
consideration; that is, whether nepotism was perceived to be acceptable and 
endorsed by others (e.g., friends, family members). Finally, moving beyond 
generic questions and abstract self-reports, I also probed participants’ 
perceptions of nepotism using brief vignettes that described different hiring 
procedure. The vignettes varied in terms of whether hirings were based on 
nepotism, and in terms of the value placed on qualifications. Participants 
indicated their agreement or disagreement with the said hiring procedures, which 










2.4.1.1. Participants and design 
 
The study employed a correlational design. Participants were recruited from 
four different countries as follows: 
 
Trinidad. One hundred and sixty-nine volunteers completed the study. One 
person was excluded because they were not Trinidadian and had been living in 
Trinidad for less than two years. The final sample consisted of one hundred and 
sixty-eight volunteers (92 females; Mage = 36.50, SDage = 9.52). Participants were 
 
recruited from the private, and public sector as well as the armed forces. The 
private sector included 93 participants which were recruited from a large 
multinational company based in Trinidad; the public sector included 62 
participants which were recruited from the University of the West Indies Trinidad 
Campus, and the armed forces included 11 participants which were recruited 
from the country national defence force. 
 
America. One hundred and ninety-nine participants completed the survey. 
Twenty-two participants failed pre-specified attention checks, one participant 
indicated that their responses were invalid and should not be used, and a further 
nine participants were excluded as they were not US nationals. The final sample 





India. One hundred and sixteen respondents completed the survey. Out 
of those, 26 failed pre-specified attention checks, leaving a final sample of ninety 
participants (28 females; Mage = 34.13, SDage = 9.63). 
 
Greece. Two hundred and twenty-nine participants took part in Study. 
Sixty-two participants failed one or more pre-specified attention checks. The final 




2.4.1.2. Procedure and Materials 
 
Trinidad. I invited participants to take part in a study looking at Work Life 
Perception in Trinidad by sending an online link to the survey administered via 
Qualtrics along with paper questionnaire to department heads at public and 
private sector organisations. Department heads then filtered this down to their 
subordinates. Participants from the private sector completed the survey online 
while members of the armed forces completed the paper survey. Public sector 
participants were asked to complete the online questionnaire but if they did not 
have access to a computer, they could access the paper copy from a 
departmental office. All participants were entered into a prize draw for Amazon 
vouchers worth $500 (TT dollars; approximately £50). 
 
America and India. American and Indian participants were recruited via 





validation study). Participants were invited to take part in a study investigating 
work life perception in exchange for being paid. 
 
Greece. Staff at six universities were contacted via email and invited to 
complete an online survey administered via Qualtrics. All participants entered 
a prize draw with a chance to win €100,- (approximately £90,-). 
 
Measures. All measures were administered in English in all four countries. 
At first, participants completed a series of measures tapping into their 
perceptions of how prevalent nepotism was in their respective country. This was 
followed by various measures tapping into participants’ perceptions of nepotism 
and relevant beliefs. Finally, participants indicated their agreement with different 
hiring scenarios. At the end, participants were given the opportunity to provide 
feedback before being thanked and debriefed. 
 
 Prevalence of nepotism. This was a new measure developed specifically 
for the purpose of this thesis. It was designed to gain a better understanding of 
the prevalence of nepotism within the countries measured in this study. 
Participants indicated how many people they knew in their circle of family and 
friends who were appointed either ‘because they had relatives in the 
organisation’, or ‘because relatives knew someone in the organisation’, or 
‘without family ties’. I calculated the proportion of hirings that fell into the first 
two categories (out of all three categories) as an indicator of individuals’ 
Personal Exposure to Nepotism. In addition, I also asked participants to indicate, 
still with reference to their circle of family and friends, how many people were 
appointed based on ‘family connections’ only, ‘family connections and merit’, or 
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‘merit’ only. The proportion of people falling into the first category (out of all 
three) provided an index of individuals’ Personal Exposure to Nepotism Without 
Merit. 
 
I also measured individuals’ perceptions of nepotistic practices in their 
countries. To this end, participants were asked to consider their country as a whole, 
and to indicate what proportion of people were appointed either ‘because they had 
relatives in the organisation’, or ‘because relatives knew someone in the 
organisation’, or ‘without family ties’. Separately, they also indicated what 
proportion of people were appointed based on ‘family connections’ only, ‘family 
connections and merit’, or ‘merit’ only. From these scales, I derived measures of 
Perceived Prevalence of Nepotism and Perceived Prevalence of Nepotism Without 
Merit, following the same principle as for the measures of personal exposure. 
 
In addition, I also employed a simplified measure to capture people’s perceptions 
of how common nepotism was in their respective countries. To that end, 
participants indicated how common the practice of favouring one’s own relatives 
or the relatives of colleagues or friends was (1 = not at all common to 7 = 
extremely common). In the USA, India, and Greece, participants answered this 
question twice, once in reference to the public sector, and once in references to 
the private sector. In addition, Trinidadians also indicated their perceptions with 
regard to the armed forces. 
 
 Endorsement of nepotism. Endorsement of nepotism was measured with 
two items, asking participants how much they agreed with the practice of 
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favouring relatives in workplace settings (e.g., ‘Favouring relatives of members of 
an organisation over other individuals who do not have any family ties’ and ‘There 
is nothing wrong about using one’s family connections to employ or advance 
someone’s career’). Both items were rated on a scale ranging from (1= strongly 
disagree, to 7 = strongly agree). 
 
 Perceptions of Nepotism. This was another new measure developed for 
the present research to gain a better understanding of the way nepotism was 
perceived by participants within their respective countries. Two sets of items 
examined whether participants thought nepotism was efficacious (1 = very 
ineffective; very damaging to 7 = very effective; very beneficial) and consistent 
with prescriptive norms (1 = very inappropriate; not at all acceptable to 7 = very 
appropriate; extremely acceptable). Again, ratings were made in relation to the 
public and the private sector, respectively (and armed forces in Trinidad only). 
Furthermore, four items measured the extent to which participants felt nepotistic 
practices were fair (e.g., ‘Do you think the practice of favouring one’s own 
relatives or the relatives of colleagues or friends is compatible with the principle of 
fairness’; 1 = definitely not to 5 = definitely yes). In addition, perceived social 
norms were assessed with a further three items (e.g., ‘Do you think the practice of 
favouring one’s own relatives or the relatives of colleagues or friends is endorsed 
by your friends’; 1 = definitely not to 5 = definitely yes). Finally, participants’ 
perception of positive and facets of nepotism for organisations was measured 
using the 20-items scale developed by Ford and McLaughlin (1986). In particular, 
ten items measured positive facets of nepotism in the workplace (e.g., ‘People 
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bearing the organization's name are more likely to impress clients’), and ten items 
measured negative facets of nepotism in the workplace (e.g., ‘Relatives pushed up 
the ladder of success by family ties hurt the organization’) . Participants were 
asked to indicate their level of agreement on a 4-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 
to 4 = strongly agree). 
 
Predictors of nepotism endorsement. The questionnaire incorporated a 
series of measures to tap into relevant values and beliefs that assumed to 
predict variations in nepotism endorsement. Social dominance orientation (SDO) 
was measured using the same scale employed in Study 1 (Pratto et al., 1994). In 
addition, four statements probed the importance of the family and family ties 
(e.g., ‘There is nothing more important in life than taking care of one’s family’), 
and a further four statements measured the extent to which individuals thought 
nepotism presented an opportunity for self-advancement (e.g., ‘Given how much 
people depend on family connections at work it would be foolish not to take 
advantage of them’). Finally, Trinidadian, American, and Indian participants also 
completed a 15-item scale measuring the extent to participants subscribed to 
meritocratic principles using items such as ‘In organizations, people who do their 
 
job well ought to rise to the top’ (Davey, Bobocel, Hing, Zanna, 1999).1 
Participants rated their agreement to all statements on a scale ranging from 









Vignettes (Trinidad, America and India). At the end, and having completed 
the various scales described above, participants were presented with vignettes 
about different hiring procedures employed by an organisation. For each vignette, 
participants indicated their evaluation (1 = very bad to 7 = very good) and 
endorsement of the hiring practice (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) 
using a 7-point scale. Vignette 1 describes a nepotistic hiring procedure, giving 
preference to relatives with minimum qualification levels. The instructions read as 
follows: 
 
When considering employees for hiring and promotion, an organization uses a 
new procedure. A minimum qualification level for each position has been set. 
The most qualified applicant above this level receives the available position 
unless there is an applicant with relatives in the organization who fulfils the 
minimum qualification level. In this case, the relative of a member of the 
organization is selected before a potentially better qualified applicant who 




Vignette 2 describes a nepotistic hiring procedure, giving preference to 
relatives irrespective of whether they are qualified or not. The scenario read 
as follows: 
 
When considering employees for hiring and promotion, an organization 





been set. The most qualified applicant above this level receives the 
available position unless there is an applicant with relatives in the 
organization. Irrespective of whether or not the applicant is qualified 
enough, the relative of a member of the organization is selected before a 







2.5.1. Data preparation 
 
 
I collapsed scale items to create single indices for the three measures of 
nepotism endorsement (2-item scale: α = .86, M = 2.93, SD = 1.59; Vignette 1: r = 
0.87, M = 2.33, SD = 1.24, Vignette 2: r = 0.86, M = 2.15, SD = 1.22); the six measures 
tapping into participants’ perceptions of nepotism (efficacy: α = .87, M = 3.43, SD = 
1.33; fairness (α = .87, M = 2.05, SD = 0.95; prescriptive norms: α = .89, M = 2.64, SD 
= 1.25; social norms: α = .81, M = 2.97, SD = 0.96; positive facets 
of nepotism: α = .78, M = 2.24, SD = 0.38; negative facets of nepotism: α = .72, M 
 
= 2.66, SD = 0.35); and the four predictors of nepotism (SDO: α = .91, M = 2.97, SD 
 
= 0.90; meritocratic ideology: α = .63, M = 4.82, SD = 0.65; opportunism: α = .87, 
 





2.5.2. Country-level differences 
 
Prevalence of nepotism. At first, I examined the proportion of family 
members and friends hired through family ties. Descriptive statistics of this index 
of Personal Exposure to Nepotism indicated that participants from India (M = 
51.04%, SD = 29.14) and Trinidad (M = 48.28%, SD = 36.98) had the highest 
personal exposure to nepotism, followed by Greece (M = 32.50%, SD = 27.02) and 
the USA (M = 30.53%, SD = 32.79. A one-way ANOVA (country: US vs. Trinidad vs. 
Greece vs. India) followed by Tukey post-hoc comparisons revealed two clusters: 
India and Trinidad on the one hand, and USA and Greece on the other hand, with 
significant differences between (ps < .001), but not within (ps ≥ .926), each of the 
two clusters, FCountry(3, 502) = 13.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .073. 
 
I also examined how many people in participants’ social circles were hired 
through nepotism without merit (Personal Exposure to Nepotism Without Merit). 
I again observed a significant difference between countries, F(3, 519) = 7.16, p < 
 
.001, ηp2 = .04, with Tukey pairwise comparisons showing that India had the 
 
highest nepotism rates (M = 24.94%, SD = 23.72), followed by Trinidad (M = 
 
16.76%, SD = 29.46), Greece (M = 14.01%, SD = 22.98), and USA (M = 10.12%, SD = 
 
21.88). Whilst India stood out and was significantly different from the other 
countries (ps ≤ .081), USA, Trinidad, and Greece did not differ from each other (ps 
 





from individuals’ personal exposure but hiring relatives without merit was more 
common in India than in any of the other countries. 
 
Next, I examined participants’ perceptions of nepotism in their countries as 
a whole (Perceived Prevalence of Nepotism). Again, I observed significant 
differences between countries, F(3, 586) = 32.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .143, with 
 
participants in Trinidad (M = 69.54%, SD = 23.89) and India (M = 60.06%, SD = 
23.02) indicating that nepotistic practices are more widespread compared to 
Greece (M = 59.28%, SD = 22.16) and USA (M = 44.86%, SD = 22.84). All countries 
differed from one another (ps < .001), with the exception of India and Greece (p = 
.994). 
 
With regard to people’s perceptions of nepotistic practices without any 
regard for relevant qualifications (Perceived Prevalence of Nepotism Without 
Merit), there were again differences in participants’ perceptions between 
 
countries, F(3, 586) = 22.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .103, with the highest figures 
obtained in Trinidad (M = 33.86%, SD = 19.34) and India (M = 31.10%, SD = 
19.29), followed by Greece (M = 27.74%, SD = 16.44) and USA (M = 18.95%, SD = 
14.45). Trinidad and India did not differ from one another (p = .613), but Trinidad 
was higher than Greece and USA (ps ≤ .007). Similarly, India did not differ from 
Greece (p = .445), but was higher than USA (p < .001). Finally, participants in the 





To corroborate these results, I also examined participants’ summative 
perceptions of how common nepotism was (across the private and public sector), 
 
which differed between countries, F(3, 585) = 27.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .124. 
Trinidadians thought nepotism was more common (M = 5.88, SD = 0.90) 
compared to Indians (M = 5.35, SD = 0.91), Greeks (M = 5.18, SD = 0.90), and US 
participants (M = 4.93, SD = 1.16). Trinidadian differed from all other participants 
(ps < .001), while Indians and Greeks did not differ (p = .522), and US participants 
differed from Indians (p = .007), but not Greeks (p = .115). Thus, people’s 
summative judgments mirrored the findings obtained when asking participants to 
judge the proportions of nepotistic and non-nepotistic hiring in their countries. 
 
In sum, individuals’ personal exposure to nepotism was largely in line with 
predictions; with Indian participants reporting the highest level of exposure, and 
American participants reporting the lowest level, although for the most part the 
latter participants did not differ from Greek and Trinidadian participants. 
 
However, a somewhat different picture emerged when looking at people’s 
impressions of the prevalence of nepotism in their countries. On this 
measure, Trinidadians asserted having particularly high levels of nepotism. 
 
Public vs. private sector. Previous research conducted in Europe and America 
suggests that nepotism is more common in the private sector than public sector 
(Abdalla et al., 1998; Bellow, 2003; Scoppa, 2009). To explore whether this pattern 





Trinidad vs. India vs. Greece vs. USA) x 2 (sector: public vs. private) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measurement on the last factor to predict variations in perceived 
commonality. Consistent with previous studies in Europe and America 
participants perceived nepotism to be more common in the private sector than in 
the public sector, F(1, 583) = 21.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. There was also a main 
effect of country, F(1, 583) = 27.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, qualified by an interaction 
 
with sector, F(3, 583) = 35.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. As can be seen in Table 2.1, 
Trinidadian participants did not reveal any systematic differences in their 
perceptions of how common nepotism was in the private and the public sector, F 
 
< 1. In contrast, US and Indian participants perceived nepotism to be more 
common in the private sector than the public sector, FUSA(1, 166) = 68.50, p < 
 
.001, η2 = .292, FIndia(1, 89) = 10.48, p = .002, η2 = .105. Finally, Greeks thought 
 
nepotism was more common in the public sector than the private sector, FGreece(1, 
 
165) = 20.28, p < .001, η2 = .109. 
 
To shed further light onto the differential perception of nepotism in public 
and private sector organisations across cultures, I also examined whether 
people’s perceptions of nepotism – how common nepotism was perceived to be, 
and what proportion of employees’ participants thought were hired through 
nepotistic means – differed depending on whether participants were employed in 
the private or the public sector. A 2 (sector: public vs. private) x 4 (country: US vs. 





systematic differences, Fs < 1. This suggests that differences in the perceived 
 
prevalence of nepotism in private and public sector organisations between 
 
countries may reflect more people’s subjective beliefs than factual differences 
 









Prevalence and endorsement of nepotism in different 
 
countries   
 Trinidad USA India Greece 
 Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 Prevalence         
   30.53  51.04  32.50  
 Personal Exposure to Nepotism 48.28% 36.98 % 32.79 % 29.15 % 27.02 
 Personal Exposure to Nepotism Without   10.12  24.94  14.01  
 Merit 16.76% 29.46 % 21.88 % 23.72 % 22.98 
   44.86  60.06  59.28  
 Perceived Prevalence of Nepotism 69.54% 23.89 % 22.84 % 23.02 % 22.16 
 Perceived Prevalence of Nepotism   18.95  31.10  27.74  
 Without Merit 33.86% 19.34 % 14.45 % 19.29 % 16.45 
 Perceived Commonality         
 Private Sector 5.86 1.00 5.53 1.29 5.66 1.00 4.93 1.14 
 Public Sector 5.90 1.22 4.34 1.66 5.04 1.51 5.42 1.14 
 Combined (Public and Private) 5.88 0.90 4.93 1.16 5.35 0.91 5.18 0.90 
 Nepotism Endorsement         
 Endorsement scale 2.86 1.06 2.86 1.19 3.55 1.11 2.40 0.97 
 Vignette 1 2.32 1.25 2.07 1.24 3.67 1.95 -- -- 





Endorsement of nepotism. Next, I examined whether participants in the 
four countries endorsed nepotism to varying extents. Looking first at the generic 
rating scale, descriptive statistics indicated that Greece had the lowest level of 
endorsement of nepotism (M = 2.40, SD = .97), and India the highest level (M = 
3.55, SD = 1.11), with Trinidad (M = 2.86, SD = 1.06) and the US (M = 2.86, SD = 
 
1.19) falling in the middle. A one-way ANOVA (country: US vs. Trinidad vs. Greece 
vs. India) revealed significant differences between countries, F(3, 586) = 22.09, p < 
 
.001, ηp2 = .10. To explore these differences further, I employed a Tukey post-
hoc test, which indicated that the high levels of endorsement observed in India 
differed significantly from the other three countries (ps < .001); the same applied 
to low levels of endorsement observed in Greece (ps < .001). In other words, 
Trinidad and the USA were on par with each other in their endorsement of 
nepotism whilst India had the highest level of endorsement and Greece the 
lowest level of endorsement of nepotism. 
 
Vignettes. Finally, I examined participants’ responses to the vignettes to 
probe country-level differences in the endorsement of nepotism. As indicated 
above, Vignette 1 describes a nepotistic hiring procedure, whereby relatives with 
a minimum level of qualification are given preference. In contrast, Vignette 2 
describes a scenario whereby relatives are given preference over non-relatives 
irrespective of their level of qualification. To examine country-level differences in 





Trinidad vs. USA vs. India) x 2 (qualification level: minimum qualification vs. no 
qualification) mixed ANOVA with repeated measurement on the last factor. The 
analysis revealed a main effect of qualification level. Participants endorsed more 
the hiring procedure that favoured Nepos with minimum qualifications (Vignette 1) 
than the hiring procedure that favour Nepos irrespective of qualifications 
(Vignette 2), F(1, 420) = 20.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. There was also a main effect of 
 
country, F(2, 420) = 51.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. Indian participants endorsed the 
hiring procedures most (M = 3.50, SD = 1.73), US participants least (M = 1.89, SD = 
1.02), with Trinidadians (M = 2.23, SD = 1.10) falling in the middle. Tukey post-hoc 
tests indicated that all three groups differed from one another (ps ≤ .033). The 
interaction between country and qualification was not significant, F < 1. 
 
Overall, country-level differences in people’s endorsement of nepotism 
were mostly consistent with predictions; with the highest level of endorsement 
observed for Indian participants across all measures. However, US participants 
only showed the lowest level of endorsement for some measures (vignettes), 







Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α), correlations, means and standard deviations   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Nepotism Endorsement              
1. Endorsement scale (.86) .31** .20** .19* .49** .25** .35** .17* -.13 .15* -.23** .21** .38** 
2. Vignette 1  (.93) .59** .02 .25** .29** .08 .28** -.26** .41** -.39** .21** .29** 
3. Vignette 2   (.92) .04 .08 .24** .01 .28** -24** .48** -.52** .26** .39** 
Perceptions of nepotism              
4. Efficacy    (.87) .37** .20* .25** -.03 -.20** -.08 .11 .17* .03 
5. Prescriptive norm     (.89) .24** .36** .15 -.11 .06 -.01 .19* .24** 
6. Fairness      (.87) .39** .16* -.11 .18* -.21** .17* .20** 
7. Social norm       (.81) .07 -.03 .08 -.01 .22 .35** 
8. Positive facets        (.78) .03 .10 -.26** .28** .44** 
9. Negative facets         (.72) .35** .32** -.06 -.07 
Predictors of nepotism              
10. SDO          (.91)   -.51**   .26** .40** 
11. Meritocratic ideology           (.63) -.10 -.21** 
12. Family orientation            (.73) .39** 
13. Opportunism             (.87) 
 Mean 2.93 2.33 2.15 3.43 2.64 2.05 2.97 2.24 2.66 2.97 4.82 4.16 3.30 
 SD 1.59 1.24 1.22 1.33 1.25 0.95 0.96 0.38 0.35 0.90 0.65 1.18 1.36 
 





2.5.2.1. Individual-level differences 
 
Perceptions of nepotism. At first, I examined perceptions of nepotism. As 
shown in Table 2.2, the more participants endorsed nepotism, the more they 
also believed nepotism was effective, acceptable (prescriptively normative), fair, 
and endorsed by others (social norms), ps < .001. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
more participants endorsed nepotism, the more they endorsed positive facets of 
nepotism and the more they rejected negative facets of nepotism, ps < .001. 
These results emerged consistently across all three different measures of 
nepotism endorsement. 
 
 Predictors of nepotism. Turning to individual-level predictors of nepotism, 
SDO was positively associated with nepotism endorsement consistent with 
Study 1. Extending the findings of Study 1, the more participants subscribed 
to meritocratic ideologies, the less they endorsed nepotism. On the other 
hand, nepotism endorsement was significantly and positively related to family 
orientation and opportunism. Again, these results emerged consistently for all 
three measures of nepotism endorsement, ps < .001. 
 
To examine the unique variance explained by all four predictor variables, I 
proceeded to conduct a multiple regression analysis. As shown in Table 2.3, SDO, 
meritocratic ideologies, family orientation and opportunism emerged as 
significant predictors in this analysis, consistently for all three measures of 







Regression analyses prediction variations in nepotism endorsement. 
  
 B SE T P 95% CI 
  Endorsement Scale   
 (Constant) 3.067 0.445 6.9 <.001   
 SDO 0.221 0.046 4.847 <.001 .131, 3.11 
 Meritocratic ideology -0.442 0.071 -6.195 <.001 -.583, -.302 
 Family orientation 0.140 0.037 3.767 <.001 .067, .213 
 Opportunism 0.242 0.033 7.228 <.001 .176, .307 
   Vignette 1   
 (Constant) 3.140 0.635 4.946 <.001   
 SDO 0.362 0.065 5.563 <.001 .234, .490 
 Meritocratic ideology -0.594 0.102 -5.831 <.001 -.795, -.394 
 Family orientation 0.173 0.053 3.264 .001 .069, .277 
 Opportunism 0.151 0.048 3.163 .002 .057, .245 
   Vignette 2   
 (Constant) 3.286 0.559 5.876 <.001   
 SDO 0.419 0.057 7.300 <.001 .306, .532 
 Meritocratic ideology -0.672 0.090 -7.488 <.001 -.849, -.496 
 Family orientation 0.150 0.047 3.215 .001 .058, .242 







Individual-level predictors as mediators of country-level differences. In a 
final step I sought to examine the potential role of SDO, meritocratic ideologies, 
family orientation and opportunism as mediators of country-level differences in 
nepotism endorsement. To this end, I conducted a multiple-mediator analysis, 
following the procedure outlined in Hayes and Preacher (2014) (Model 4). For the 
purpose of this analysis, I aggregated the three measures of nepotism 
endorsement (generic answer scale, Vignette 1, Vignette 2) in countries where 
multiple measures where available (USA, Trinidad, India; α = .81). Similarly, the 





and India where this measure was available (including or excluding meritocratic 
ideologies alongside the other mediator variables in the USA, Trinidad, and India 
did not change the conclusions drawn from the analysis). 
 
Table 2.4, shows all overall, direct, and indirect effects (via the four 
mediators), using USA as a reference country to compare the other countries 
against. As can be seen, increased levels of SDO, lowered levels of meritocratic 
ideologies, and an increased family orientation partially mediated the 
substantively higher levels of nepotism endorsement observed in India relative to 
the USA. Increased levels of SDO, lowered levels of meritocratic ideologies also 
mediated the greater nepotism endorsement observed in Trinidad relative to the 
USA. Utilitarian views of nepotism were higher in the USA than in Trinidad, which 
means that opportunism actually had a depressing effect on the gap between the 







Individual-level variable predictors mediating country-level differences in nepotism 
endorsement.   
 B SE 95% CI  B SE 95% CI  B SE 95% CI 
 Effect Greece vs. USA  Trinidad vs. USA   India vs. USA  
 Total Effect 0.183 0.115 -.043, .409 0.229 0.116 .002, .456 1.299 0.138 1.029, 1.570 
 Direct Effect 0.348 0.103 .147, .550 0.111 0.104 -.092, .315 0.746 0.121 .509, .984 
 Indirect Effect (via SDO) 0.136 0.051 .042, .242 0.29 0.063 .176, .421 0.459 0.078 .318, .621 
 Indirect Effect (via Meritocratic             
 Ideology) -- -- -- 0.229 0.057 .132, .355 0.377 0.065 .255, .512 
 Indirect Effect (via Family             
 Orientation) -0.100 0.033 -.172, -.042 -0.026 0.021 -074, .009 0.057 0.025 .012, .109 








The present study examined people’s exposure to, and perceptions of, 
nepotism in countries that differ in the cultural values of collectivism (vs. 
individualism) and power distance. I hypothesised that nepotism would be more 
strongly endorsed, and be more prevalent, in a collectivistic, high power distance 
country distance such as India. In contrast, an individualistic, (relatively) low 
power distance country such as the USA nepotism should be less strongly 
endorsed and also be less prevalent relative to India, but also relative to countries 
such as Trinidad and Greece, which are more collectivistic than the USA. To 
examine this hypothesis, I gathered responses from Indian, American, Trinidadian, 
and Greek respondents. As anticipated, the results indicated that nepotism was 
most prevalent in India and least prevalent in the USA. Perceptions of the 
prevalence of nepotism appeared to be somewhat inflated, and this tendency 
was most pronounced in Trinidad, where participants felt that nepotism was 
more common compared to India. As expected, India had the highest level of 
nepotism endorsement, but somewhat surprisingly the lowest level of nepotism 
endorsement was observed in Greece. 
 
In an exploratory fashion, I also examined people’s perceptions of 
nepotism in the public and private sector. Whilst Trinidadian participants did not 
differentiate between the public and private sector, US and Indian participants 





sector. The opposite was the case for Greek participants who thought nepotism 
was more common in the public sector than the private sector. These latter 
results need to be treated with caution as it may be influenced by the fact that 
public sector workers were over-represented in the Greek sample (relative to 
the other samples). Using participants’ own experiences as a guide to discern 
differences in the prevalence of nepotism in the public and private sector, no 
reliable effects were found. In other words, perceived differences between the 
public and private sector may reflect more people’s stereotypes than actual 
differences observed in different sectors. 
 
Turning to individual-level variables, the present study revealed that 
positive attitudes towards nepotism (e.g., nepotism endorsement) correlated 
significantly with beliefs that nepotism was effective, acceptable (prescriptively 
normative), fair, endorsed by others (social norms), and associated with positive 
outcomes for individuals and organisations. These findings contribute to shed 
light onto how people may adopt very conflicting views when assessing the 
benefits and drawbacks of nepotism. 
 
Consistent with Study 1, I once again observed a positive association between 
SDO and nepotism endorsement, which held when controlling for other predictor 
variables. These results align with the literature showing that individuals with high 
SDO inclinations tend to support practices that reinforce hierarchical differentiation 





contributed to explain the higher levels of nepotism endorsement observed in 
India and, to a lesser extent, Trinidad. It stands to reason that Indians are more 
inclined to subscribe to SDO because of their caste system which provides a strict 
hierarchical system with dominant groups at the top and subordinate groups at 
the bottom. This suggests that societies characterised by classism and inequality 
provide environments that are particularly conducive to nepotism. All in all, the 
present findings underscore the importance of dominance and (unequal) power 
relations as antecedents of nepotism. 
 
Family orientation was positively associated with nepotism endorsement. 
This is consistent with the literature arguing that nepotism is more common in 
collectivistic cultures (e.g., Wated & Sanchez, 2012). However, when considered 
alongside power and dominance, family orientation might not be quite as a 
crucial. For example, in the present research it contributed to explain differences 
between Indian and American participants, but it did not explain differences 
between Trinidadian and American participants. 
 
Opportunism had a positive association with nepotism endorsement and 
contributed to explain individual differences in nepotism endorsement. However, 
opportunism did not contribute to explain the higher levels of nepotism 
endorsement observed in India compared the USA. Furthermore, participants 
from the US subscribed more to utilitarian views of nepotism than did Greek or 





Trinidad than in the US, this was in spite of American participants being more 
inclined to endorse the use of nepotism for self-advancement. These results 
suggest that there is more to nepotism than getting on economically,  
considering that Trinidad is a less wealthy country compared to the USA with a 
higher prevalence of nepotism. 
 
From an individual difference level perspective, the more individuals 
endorsed nepotism less likely they were to subscribe to meritocratic ideologies. 
This fall in line with the work of Son Hing et al. (2011), who suggested that 
individuals who prefer meritocracy are more concerned with fairness and equal 
opportunities to all, and consequently less likely to endorse nepotistic practices. 
At a country level, India had the highest level of nepotism endorsement in the 
hiring and promotion process, and this this was partially mediated by Indians (vs. 
American’s) inclination to reject meritocratic beliefs. This is consistent with 
Fischer and Smith (2003), who suggested that the more hierarchical societies are 
the more people will tend to endorse inequality over meritocratic ideologies. 
This empirical study adds to this work showing that the more individuals 











The empirical work reported in this chapter contributes to the 
recognition that nepotism is very multi-faceted and there are important 
individual- and country-level differences in the endorsement of nepotism. 
Support for nepotism appears to be closely linked to the endorsement of 
inequality and hierarchical differentiation and to the rejection of meritocratic 
ideologies. Perhaps not surprisingly, the more strongly people value supporting 
their family, the more they are also inclined to endorse nepotistic practices. At 
the same time, support for nepotism can also reflect selfish motives if people 
belief they can benefit personally from it. 
 
The present findings extend previous research suggesting that 
individualistic societies have greater levels of meritocracy and lower levels of 
nepotism (Basabe & Ros, 2005; Kyriacou, 2016). The present work shows that 
hierarchical relations (i.e., power distance) appear to be equally if not more 
important in providing a cultural setting that favours nepotistic practices. Of 
course, this does not preclude variations observed within a given cultural setting, 
as illustrated in recent times by the nepotistic actions of a head of state of an 
individualistic cultures (USA). All in all, the studies presented in this chapter have 





psychology and by drawing social psychological theories and concepts to explore 
 







3.1. Chapter summary 
 
 
This chapter consist of two empirical studies on actual and perceived 
consequences of nepotism, focussing on work attitude, performance and well-
being in the workplace. Study 3 was carried out in Trinidad with service personnel 
from an arm of the Defence Force. In this study, qualification played a crucial role 
in determining the consequences of nepotism for the individuals in their work 
environment. Study 4 was carried out in the UK with university students. The 
results of this study indicated that commitment and well-being were perceived to 
be greater for employees from a nepotistic (vs. non-nepotistic) firm. 
Furthermore, employees in a nepotistic firm were perceived to have greater 
levels of autonomy and control than employees in the non-nepotistic firm. 
Unexpectedly, students perceived qualifications as inconsequential for 





3.2. Studies overview 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine actual and perceived consequences of 
nepotism, looking at qualification as a potential moderating variable. In other 
words, I will compare suitably qualified and unqualified nepots with employees 
hired non-nepotistically. As outlined in Chapter 1, I predict qualifications play an 
important role in determining whether nepotism has positive or negative effects 
on employees and organisation. 
 
In Study 3, a longitudinal study conducted in a military setting, I examine 
the actual consequences of nepotism for control and autonomy, psychological 
well-being and performance, separately for beneficiaries of nepotism who are 
highly qualified and those who are unqualified but gained their position through 
family connections. In Study 4, I will explore the perceived consequences of 
nepotistic practices. Here, I am looking at the way lay individuals perceive 
nepotistic practices, and whether individuals (implicitly or explicitly) recognise the 
importance of qualifications. 
 
There is a paucity of empirical work from scholars addressing the role of 
qualification (i.e., competence and skill) in nepotistic hiring. The present research 
contributes to rectify this and in so doing seeks to reconcile the literature which 
has predominantly focused on negative consequences of nepotism with few 
authors addressing the potential benefits of nepotism for areas such as work 





lies in delineating when and why nepotism may have negative and indeed positive 
implications for individuals and organisations, as well as offering a better 




3.3. Study 3 
 
The aim of Study 3 was to provide empirical evidence that leads to a 
greater understanding of the consequences of nepotism for employees. To this 
end, I focussed on work attitudes, well-being, performance, and perceptions of 
organisational practices as outcome variables. I chose these variables based on 
the relative paucity of empirical literature examining these variables in the 
context of nepotism. By measuring the extent to which individuals who are 
nepotistic or nepotistic but suitably qualified and non-nepotistic vary on these 
outcomes one can have a greater appreciation of the consequences nepotism 
have within the work environment. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, I hypothesised that the consequences for 
nepotism when not matched with adequate qualifications may be largely 
negative. Wong and Kleiner (1994) suggested that not having the competence to 
match an appointment can be detrimental for nepots in the long term. 
Meanwhile, Pearce and colleagues observed in their longitudinal study that 
nepotism can have a negative effect on performance levels for nepotistic 





role conflict based on a lack of confidence or competence to carry out the 
designated job can affect well-being and performance of personnel. It stands to 
reason that unqualified nepots would be particularly inclined to experience role 
conflict and lower levels of autonomy and control. In addition, prior research has 
suggested that nepotism negatively affects job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment (Arasli et al. 2006; Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Padgett & Morris, 2005, 
2012). Based on these and related findings outlined in more depth in Chapter 1, I 
predicted that unqualified nepots would experience lower job satisfaction and 
lower levels of organisational commitment. 
 
A similar reasoning applies to employees’ well-being and performance. 
Unqualified nepots may experience poorer well-being over time and lower 
performance levels than their colleagues. This would be consistent with Abdulla 
et al. (1998) and Arasli et al. (2006) who found that nepotistic individuals had 
poorer psychological well-being and performance levels than their non-nepotistic 
colleagues. I therefore predicted that unqualified nepots would show evidence of 
lower levels of psychological well-being and lowered performance compared to 
non-nepotistic colleagues. 
 
In contrast, qualified nepots should not suffer from these predicaments. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, qualified nepots benefit from having suitable 
qualifications and competencies to carry out their designated job whilst having 





should contribute to higher levels of performance and enhanced well-being on 
the job. By the same token, qualified nepots should benefit from having greater 
levels of autonomy and control because they possess the competency to fulfil 
the requirements of their role (Aube, Rousseau, & Morin, 2007), and they are 
less likely to experience role conflict. 
 
Conversely, nepots who do not have relevant competence and job skills, 
may not perform as well as suitably qualified candidates. Conflict may arise 
between non-nepotostic employees and employees who were hired because of 
nepotism. On the other hand, compared to qualified nepots and non-nepots, 
unqualified nepots may have more positive perception of organisational 
practices, and they would be less critical of organisational practices as those 
practices meet their needs. Thus, I predicted that unqualified nepots would be 
more amenable to nepotism and less likely to have any discord with 
organisational practices. Unqualified nepots should also be more likely to think 
that the organisation is fair and objective in performance evaluation, and that 
methods used in recruitment and selection are fair and transparent. 
 
To address the aforementioned hypothesis, I recruited active service 
personnel from a military base in the Caribbean. This setting is ideal as it is widely 
assumed that nepotism is actively practiced in the military. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon to witness families in which three or more consecutive generations 





was deemed an honour to serve in the force of their forefathers (Lewin, 1943). 
The decision to enlist in the military is often taken not just for economic or 
political reasons, but the concept of families and communities established by the 
military is a key source of defusing intergenerational information related to 
military service. As such, wanting to serve becomes a family tradition (Kleykamp, 
2006). It has been argued that there is a strong influence on enlistment by 
personnel when a parent served or serves in the military; offspring’s of active 
and former military personnel are more likely to serve once enlisted and more 
likely than others to serve long-term (Faris, 1981, 1984; Kilburn & Klerman, 1999; 
Segal & Segal, 2004). 
 
Continuing a military family tradition can be a primary reason why people 
enlist into the military (Faris, 1981, 1984). Previous research suggested children 
adopt similar career paths as their parents for different reasons, but some of the 
most common reasons are the continuity of family presence in the organisation, 
loyalty, and branding (Bellow, 2003). As a result, farmers’ children become 
farmers, politicians’ children go into politics, and the children of military 
personnel enlist to serve their country (Groothuis & Groothuis, 2008). It stands to 
reason that this may lead people to enlist even though they may be unsuitable for 
the service. The concept of “military institutional presence” (Kelykamp, 2006, p. 





retired from the service or on active duty may influence the enlistment decision 
of an individual (Segal & Segal, 2004). 
 
To identify nepotistic individuals in the present research, I used self-reports 
of family enrolled in the service who were actively serving or deactivated from 
the service and entrance level education as specified by the service personnel 
which was validated through certificates in each service personnel file. Using this 
information, I proceeded to classify respondents into qualified nepotistic, 
unqualified nepotistic and non-nepotistic hires. I then assessed various 
dimensions of work attitudes, well-being, and perceptions of organisational 
practices using self-reports. Performance was derived from personnel files and 
based on appraisal scores. A subset of the total sample completed the study in 






3.3.1.1. Participants and Design 
 
 
This longitudinal field study employed a correlational design. Data were 
collected in two waves (Time 1 and Time 2). One hundred and sixty-five military 
personnel participated in the first wave (Time 1), and out of those 147 
personnel completed the second wave (Time 2). In addition, 273 personnel 
participated in the second wave only, thus resulting in a total sampled of 420 






1030) at the time the study was carried out. Twelve per cent of respondents were 
females and 88% were males, which is indicative of the ratio of males to females 
in the force; personnel ages ranged from 19 to 58 years (50 females; Mage = 
 
27.8, SDage = 8.1). The sample included both ratings and officers. Ratings (non-
commissioned officers) accounted for ninety-four per cent (94%) of the surveyed 
sample of which forty-one per cent (41%) were categorised as nepotistic using the 
classification scheme described below. Officers accounted for six per cent (6%) of 
the surveyed sample of which less than one per cent (1%) was categorised as 
nepotistic. 
 
Classification of nepotistic and non-nepotistic personnel. To probe the 
existence of nepotistic kinship networks, participants indicated whether they had 
any family members enrolled in the Defence Force (currently or previously). 
Furthermore, in order to establish whether personnel where qualified or 
unqualified for a military career at the time of entering the force, participants 
also indicated their education level when entering the force. This information was 
later validated by accessing personnel files. Ratings were classified into one of 
three groups according to their entrance status: (a) qualified nepotistic hires - 
personnel in this category had family in the service, and they were suitably 
qualified on the basis of their assessment scores and education level; (b) 
unqualified nepotistic hires - personnel in this category had family in the service, 





and/or education level; and (c) non-nepotistic hires - personnel in this category 
were suitably qualified but did not have any family in the Defence 
 
Force. Commissioned officers (see table 3.1 below) were classified in a similar 
manner as ratings. However, all officers had to be suitably qualified for the 
position on application and this was also evident in their personnel files. 
Consequently, all commissioned officers were either non-nepotistic, or nepotistic 





Frequency of Ratings and Officers according to their entrance status.   
 Unqualified Nepotistic Qualified Nepotistic Non-Nepotistic Total 
Ratings 79 92 224 395 
Officers 0 5 19 25 





3.3.1.2. Procedure and materials 
 
All procedures and materials had to be acceptable to the Defence Force. 
Consequently, the survey was vetted a number of times by a defence force focus 
group comprising of the presiding commanding officer at the time, three 
lieutenant commanders, five sub lieutenants, and two chief petty officers (CPO) 
across various departments. The aim was to ensure that the questionnaire was 
culturally sensitive, confidential, worded appropriately, geared towards all ranks, 
questions were not misleading to personnel, and personnel with below-average 





Personnel, including ratings and commissioned officers, were recruited 
from an island in the Caribbean Defence Force via a weekly memo published in a 
departmental newsletter. Participants were told the aim of this research was to 
investigate the effects of nepotism on work attitudes and psychological well-
being. There was no reward for taking part in the research and all information 
collected was kept confidential. Each personnel had the option to opt out 
whenever they wanted before, during or after filling out the questionnaire. All 
questionnaires were identifiable only by personnel service numbers. 
 
Data was collected over a period of three months; each head of 
department was briefed by the commanding officer to relieve personnel from 
their duties to participate in the study. Personnel who volunteered to be a part 
of this study were under no pressure from command to participate or to 
complete the questionnaire. The survey was administered in English in the 
presence of the researcher. 
 
Personnel scores obtained at selection, training and appraisals were 
requested in the questionnaire. All scores collected were verified based on 
personnel files. Other relevant information included in personnel files included 
educational certificates, training certificates, selection scores, training scores, and all 
appraisal scores participants had from the time of enlistment. Two junior rates and 





files based on service numbers (unique identification number), which was 




Measures. Participants completed a series of demographic items followed 
by measures designed to explore work attitudes and psychological well-being. 
Measures of well-being (GHQ-12) were available at Time 1 and 2. All other 
measures described below were administered at Time 2 only, with the exception 
of performance appraisal scores, which were available for the time of entry to the 
Force and for Time 2. 
 
Work attitudes. A series of measures tapped into different facets of work 
attitudes: 
 
Autonomy and control. This measure was developed by Jackson et al. 
 
(1993) and was used in this study to examine the extent of autonomy and 
 
choice personnel had in their day to day duties. The scale consisted of three 
items measuring autonomy (e.g., ‘To what extent can you choose what work you 
will carry out’) and three items measuring choice (e.g. ’To what extent can you 
determine the methods and procedure used in your job’). Responses were 
provided on a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = A Great deal). 
 
Role conflict. Role conflict was measured using a seven-item scale 





request from two or more people’). All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 
 
= Very false to 7 = Very true). 
 
Organisational commitment. A measure adopted from Slaven (2002) was 
used to gain a better understanding of how committed service personnel were 
to the organisation. The scale consisted of seven items all measuring 
organisational commitment (e.g. ‘I am proud to tell people I am on this force’). All 
items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Leader support and team support. This measure was 
 
developed by Bridger and Kilminster (2006) and examined the relationship 
personnel had with their immediate superior and the extent of peer support 
provided by fellow personnel. The scale had three items measuring the 
relationship with superiors (e.g.,’ How friendly and easy is it to approach is your 
superior?’) and three items measuring the relationship with peers (e.g., ‘To what 
extent can you count on your colleagues to back you up at work?’). Answers 
were provided on a 5-point scale (1 = to a very little extent to 5 = to a very great 
extent). 
 
Job satisfaction. Job satisfaction was measured using a single item taken 
from Cooper and colleagues (1998). The item read ‘How satisfied are you with 






Value similarity. This measure was developed for the present study. 
Participants responded to two items to indicate how similar their own values 
were to the value of the organisation (‘Did you believe your values were similar to 
that of the service before joining?’; ‘How similar are the values of the service to 
your own personal values?’). Answers were provided on a 5-point scale (1 = Very 
similar to 5 = Very dissimilar). 
 
Perception of organisational practices. Five scales developed 
specifically for the present study and the organisation assessed personnel’s 
perceptions of organisational practices. These items were developed with 
the help of a focus group from the military to ensure the questions were 
sensitive to the organisation and personnel.  
 
Perceived meritocracy. This scale consisted of three items measuring 
personnel perception of important factors required to enlist someone in the 
service (e.g., ‘To what extend do you believe score on selection process to be 
important in the decision to enlist someone’). Responses were provided on a 5-
point scale (1 = Not at all important to 5 = Incredibly important). 
 
Perceived nepotism. This scale consisted of three items measuring 
personnel perception of important factors required to enlist someone in the 
service (e.g., ‘To what extend do you believe education level to be important in 
the decision to enlist someone’). Responses were provided on a 5-point scale (1 = 
Not at all important to 5 = Incredibly important). 
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Discord with practices. This scale consisted of three items capturing the extent 
to which personnel were in agreement with the methods used to enlist, 
develop and appraise personnel within the service (e.g., ‘ How often do you 
agree with the methods used by the service in the training process’). 
Responses were provided on a 5-point scale (1 = Always agree to 5 = Always 
disagree). 
 
Transparency of personnel selection. This scale consisted of a single item 
measuring personnel perception of transparency of the service (e.g., ‘How 
transparent do you believe your organisation is in terms of recruitment and 
selection’)? Responses were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = Very transparent to 5 
 
= Not at all transparent). 
 
Fairness of performance evaluation. This scale consisted of a single item 
measuring personnel perception of fairness of performance evaluation (e.g., ‘I 
think my superior evaluated my performance objectively and without prejudice’). 
Responses were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = Very objective to 5 = Very 
subjective). 
 
Well-being. Personnel’s psychological well-being was assessed using the 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12). This is a 12-item measure capturing 
experiences of depression, bouts of anxiety, social dysfunction and somatic 
symptoms (Goldberg, 1972; 1978). For example an item could read ‘Have you 
recently lost much sleep over worry’?. Answers were provided by selecting one of 
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four options (e.g., Not at all; No more than usual; Rather more than usual; Much 




 Performance. Personnel were allocated a percentage score by their 
divisional officer biannually based on their exam and training results for 
promotion and a percentage score reflecting service personnel’s level of fitness, 
leadership skills, ability to work under pressure, ability to take and carry out 
orders, and general accountability. The accumulated total score was place in 








Verbal consent for this study was granted in 2008 by the residing 
Commanding Officer of this arm of the Defence Force. The Commanding 
Officer granted the researcher full access to bases, personnel of all ranks and 
personnel files without prejudice until completion of the research. The broad 
aim of the investigation was to uncover how personnel were selected, trained 
and currently performing based on their appraisal scores and their level of 
psychological well-being. The investigation was approved under the terms of 
a Service Review by the University of Liverpool Ethics board. Further ethical 
approval to exploit the existing data set for research purposes was granted by 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of Kent. The study 
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adhered to the ethical guidelines of the British Psychological Society. Ethical 
requirements were met by obtaining informed consent from each serving 
personnel who volunteered to complete the questionnaire. Personnel were 
assured that their data will be held in a secure location, remain anonymous, and 
no senior officers will have access to questionnaires filled out by personnel. All 
data was given a unique identification number and access to this data was 






3.3.2.1. Data preparation 
 
Response to the GHQ-12 were scored following Goldberg (1972). This 
involved ascribing a value of 1 to affirmative responses, and a value of 0 to 
negating responses. Answers are summed so that a respondent would receive 
a score between 1 and 12 with a higher score indicating a greater number of 
symptoms indicating poor psychological well-being. 
 
All multi-item scales were collapsed into composites to be used in the 






Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α), correlations, means and standard deviations 
  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
Work Attitudes                
1. Autonomy and Control (.87) -.07 -.21** .25** .32** .20** -.12* .04 .29** -.06** -.04 -.05 -.12* .24** .34** 
2. Role Conflict  (.06) .16* -.18** -.19** -.06 .15** -.03 -.07 .10* .05 .12* .11* -.02 -.05 
3. Job satisfaction   (n/a) -,46** -.33** -.26** .26** -.07 .06 .30** .23** .08 .25** -.02 -.04 
4. Organisational Commitment    (.78) .35** .29** -.27** .21** .13** -.21** -.12* .01 -.27** .03 .09 
5. Leader Support     (.86) .32** -.15** .07 .06 -.18** -.08 -.14* -.24 .15** .17** 
6. Peer Support      (.83) -.16** .80 .05 -.17** -.08 -.03 -.22** .09 .10 
7. Value Similarity       (.67) -.11* -.14** .20** .15** .09 .18** -.02 -.03 
Perception of Organisational Practices                
8. Perceived Meritocracy        (.67) -24** .07 .06 .08 .05 .00 .05 
9. Perceived Nepotism         (.30) -.02 -.01 .16** .00 -.00 .04 
10. Discord with Practices          (.75) .33** .14** .14** .15* .19** 
11. Transparency of Personnel Selection           (n/a) .12* .05 .17** .14** 
12. Fairness of Performance Evaluation            (n/a) .15** -.03 -.12* 
Well Being                
13. GHQ-12             (.87) -.14** -.11 
Performance                
14. Appraisal (Initial)              (n/a) .60** 
15. Appraisal (Current)               (n/a) 
  Mean 2.70 4.18 2.70 3.60 3.14 3.13 2.74 3.83 3.03 3.14 3.01 2.80 2.54 69.72 66.92 
  SD 0.95 0.91 1.17 0.72 0.97 0.96 1.08 0.80 0.79 0.98 1.26 1.13 2.54 17.59 41.81   





3.3.2.2. Main analysis 
 
Since there were no unqualified nepotistic officers, I performed separate 
analyses on ratings and officers, as follows: As a first step, I conducted analyses 
of variance comparing qualified nepotistic ratings, unqualified nepotistic ratings 
and non-nepotistic ratings’ perceptions of organisational practices, work-
attitudes, performance, and well-being (see Table 3.3). Post-hoc follow-up test 
were employed for comparisons between groups. In a second step, I explored the 
contributions of work-attitudes to well-being and job performance. Finally, I 
repeated the first step, focusing on the comparison between qualified nepotistic 





Ratings’ wellbeing and job performance. I sought to explore 
 
how qualification and nepotism affected rating’s psychological well-being, as well 
as their performance on the job. Recall that GHQ-12 scores measuring well-being 
were available at Time 1 and 2, thus also allowing me to explore changes in the 
wellbeing of ratings over time. Performance was operationalized as appraisal 
scores at the time of entering the force as well as the most recent appraisal at 
Time 2. 
 
Well-being (Time 2). GHQ-12 composite scores were submitted to a one-





nepotistic ratings and non-nepotistic ratings. The results revealed no significant 
difference between the three groups, F(2, 389) = 1.85, p = .06, ηp2 = .01. However 
post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that unqualified 
nepotistic ratings (M = 3.03, SD = 2.54) had higher GHQ-12 scores denoting a 
poorer psychological well-being than either qualified nepotistic (M = 2.38, SD = 
2.42) or non-nepotistic (M = 2.42, SD = 2.45) ratings (ps < .05). 
 
Change in well-being (Time 1 versus Time 2). To examine change in well-being, I 
conducted a 3 (entrance status: unqualified nepotistic vs. qualified nepotistic vs. 
non-nepotistic) x 2 (assessment period: GHQ-12 Time 1 vs. GHQ-12 Time 2) mixed 
model analysis of variance with repeated measurement on the last factor. The 
analysis was conducted on a subset of ratings for which Time 1 data were available 
(see Participant section for further details). The analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between entrance status and assessment period, F(2, 130)=3.49, p = 
.033,  ηp2 = .05. An examination of changes in well-being were carried out 
separately for the three groups, which showed that qualified nepotistic ratings 
displayed an increase in well-being over the assessment period (Ms = 3.04 vs. 1.69; 
SDs = 3.22 vs. 2.35), F(1, 44) = 3.43, p = .066, ηp2 = .03.  And the well-being of 
unqualified nepotistic declined as indicated by the ANOVA results (unqualified 
nepotistic): Ms = 2.32 vs. 3.41, SDs = 2.46 vs. 3.16, F(1, 21) = 5.58, p = .020, ηp2 = 
113 
.04; non-nepotistic: Ms = 2.51 vs. 1.61, SDs = 2.35 vs. 2.13, F(1, 65) = 2.34, p = .131, 
ηp2 = .26 
 Job performance (initial). Entrance status had a significant effect on 
the ratings’ initial appraisal scores, F(2, 395) = 9.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Post hoc 
 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that unqualified 
nepotistic ratings (M = 61.86, SD = 7.83) performed worse than the other 
groups (ps < .001), which did not differ in their initial appraisals 
(qualified nepotistic: M = 75.60, SD = 16.59; non-nepotistic: M = 72.70, 
SD = 16.07). 
 
Job performance (current). The three groups also had different current 
 
appraisal scores, F(2, 310) = 32.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Unqualified nepotistic 
ratings had the lowest performance scores (M = 32.26 , SD = 37.96), followed by 
non-nepotistic ratings (M = 73.11, SD = 40.25). Qualified nepotistic on the other 
hand displayed the highest level of performance (M = 90.15, SD = 24.54). Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test showed that all three groups differed from 
one another (ps ≤ .002). Thus, while qualified nepotistic ratings and non-
nepotistic ratings did not differ in initial appraisals, the former group 
outperformed the latter in their current appraisals. 
 
Change in performance (initial versus current). To examine changes in 
performance, I conducted a 3 (entrance status: unqualified nepotistic vs. qualified 
nepotistic vs. non-nepotistic) x 2 (appraisal: initial vs. current) mixed model 
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analysis of variance with repeated measurement on the last factor. The analysis 
revealed a main effect of appraisal, F(2, 307) = 7.65, p = .006, ηp2 = .24, qualified 
by a significant interaction with entrance status, F(2, 307) = 29.94, p < .001, ηp2 
=.09. Further analysis showed that non-nepotistic ratings did not change in their 
performance, F < 1. In contrast, the performance of qualified nepotistic ratings 
showed a significant increase, F(1, 83) = 40.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, while the 









Comparison of ratings’ work attitudes, perception of organisational procedures, well-
being, and performance as a function of their entrance status   
Non- Qualified Unqualified   
Nepotistic Nepotistic Nepotistic F N 

































2.63a 3.00b 2.54a  
(.94) (.86) (.97) 
 
4.24a 4.08a 4.14a  
(.86) (1.00) (.87) 
 
2.75a 2.72a 2.72a  
(1.21) (1.13) (1.12) 
 
3.54a 3.65a 3.59a  
(.72) (.73) (.68) 
 
3.13a 3.25a 3.09a  
(.99) (.92) (1.01) 
 
3.15a 3.09a 3.01a  
(.94) (.97) (.98) 
 
2.79a 2.75a 2.60a 




3.71a 3.62a 3.47b 
(.60) (.68) (.69) 
 
2.34a 2.76b 2.95b 
(1.30) (1.23) (1.22) 
 
3.13a 3.33a 2.95b 
(.99) (.91) (1.05) 
 
3.11a 3.11a 2.66b 





























      
Fairness of 
2.79ab 2.65a 3.01b 
   
Performance 2.25 394  
(1.10) (1.11) (1.19)  
Evaluation          
Well-being       
GHQ-12 
2.42a 2.38a 3.03b 
1.85† 392 
 
(2.45) (2.42) (2.86)      
Performance       
Appraisal (Initial) 
72.70a 75.60a 61.86b 
9.64*** 395 
 
(16.07) (16.59) (7.83)      
Appraisal (Current) 
73.11a 90.15b 32.26c 
32.66*** 310 
 
(40.25) (24.54) (37.96)      
 
***p < .001, ** p < .01, * < .05, † < .10. Means with same subscripts within rows 





To summarise, unqualified nepotistic ratings had a poorer well-being at 
Time 2 when the main survey took place. In contrast, qualified nepotistic ratings 
did not differ from non-nepotistic ratings. However, the well-being of qualified 
nepotistic ratings increased over time during the assessment period. A similar 
picture emerged for job performance. Unqualified nepotistic ratings performed 
worse than other ratings. Their performance also declined over time. 
Conversely, qualified nepotistic ratings performed as well as non-nepotistic 
ratings at the time of entering the force. However, qualified nepotistic 
 
ratings’ performance showed a steeper increase over time, and they had the best 
current appraisal scores out of all three groups. 
 
Ratings’ perceptions of organisational practices. Next, I examined 
ratings’ perceptions of organisational practices. 
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= Perceived meritocracy and nepotism. Ratings differed in the extent to which they 
thought nepotism and meritocracy were important factors in hiring decisions, 
FNepotism(2, 395) = 8.29, p = 0.04, ηp2 = .02, FMeritocracy(2, 384) = 4.14, p =0.03, ηp2 = 
.21. Post-hoc comparisons showed that qualified nepotistic ratings (M=3.62, SD 
= 0.68) and non-nepotistic ratings (M = 3.71, SD = 0.59) were more convinced 
than unqualified nepotistic ratings (M = 3.47, SD = 0.69) that qualification are an 
important factor in hiring decisions, ps < .05. Non-nepotistic ratings rated the 
importance of family ties lower (M = 2.34, SD = 1.30) compared to the two 
nepotistic groups, which did not differ (unqualified: M = 2.95 SD = 
 
1.22; qualified: M = 2.76, SD = 1.23). Further mixed model analyses showed that 
while all three groups of ratings believed that qualification was more important 
than family ties, the difference was more pronounced for qualified nepotistic 
ratings and non-nepotistic ratings than for unqualified nepotistic ratings, F(2, 381) 
= 14.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. 
 
Discord with organisational practices. The ratings also showed different 
levels of discordance with the methods used for recruitment, training and 
 
selection, F(2, 395) = 4.35, p = 0.04, ηp2 = .01. Post hoc comparisons using 
 
the Tukey HSD test revealed that unqualified nepotistic ratings were less critical 
and more accepting of organisational procedures (M = 2.95, SD = 1.05) compared 
to qualified nepotistic ratings (M = 3.33, SD = 0.98) and non-nepotistic ratings (M 
= 3.13, SD = 0.99), who did not differ in their level of discord. 
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Transparency in recruitment. Entrance status also had a significant impact on how 
transparent the ratings thought the recruitment and selection process was, F(2, 
395) = 4.17, p = 0.04, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that unqualified nepotistic ratings (M = 2.66, SD = 1.18) felt that the 
recruitment and selection process was more transparent than did the qualified 
nepotistic (M = 3.11, SD = 1.28) or non-nepotistic ratings (M = 3.11, SD = 1.26). 
 
To summarise, non-nepotistic ratings and qualified nepotistic ratings 
showed a high level of agreement in their perception of organisational practices. 
In contrast, unqualified nepotistic ratings were less critical of organisational 
practices and felt that merit was less important in hiring decisions. They also 
asserted that recruitment was more transparent than did the other groups of 
ratings. 
 
Ratings’ work attitudes. I proceeded to explore the effects of nepotism 
and qualification on work attitudes. To this end, I conducted a similar set of 
analysis as before, this time focusing on ratings’ work attitudes and perceptions 
of organisational procedures. Initial analyses did not yield any between-group 
differences in terms of the level of role conflict, job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment, the level of support ratings felt they received from leaders and 
peers. The discussion below focuses on the only facet of work attitudes where 
group differences were found autonomy and control. 
 
A one-way analysis of variance showed that the three groups differed in 
 





comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that qualified nepotistic 
 
ratings experienced a higher level of autonomy and control (M = 3.00, SD = 0.86) 
than unqualified nepotistic ratings (M = 2.54, SD = 0.97) or non-nepotistic ratings 
(M = 2.63, SD = 0.93). The latter two groups did not differ. Thus, paralleling the 
findings obtained for well-being and job performance, nepotism led to positive 
outcomes in terms of perceived autonomy and control, but only when combined 
with a suitable level of qualification when entering the force.  
Contributions of work attitudes to ratings’ well-being and performance. 
 
 Entrance status affected perceptions of autonomy and control but no other 
facet of work attitudes. Perceptions of autonomy and control are closely linked to 
job performance: the greater individuals’ perceptions of autonomy and control, the 
better people tend to perform in their jobs (Slaven, 2002). Similarly, numerous 
studies have also established a positive association between autonomy and control 
and well-being (Athanasiades & Winthrop, 2007; Judge & Locke, 1993; Slaven, 
2002). The same pattern also emerged in the present study. As can be seen in 
Table 3.2, autonomy and control correlated positively with ratings’ initial and 
current appraisal scores, and negatively with scores on the GHQ-12. Thus, it 
stands to reason that the increased perception of autonomy and control of 
qualified nepotistic ratings may play a role in the enhanced performance and 
the positive changes in well-being experienced by this group. To explore this 





procedure of Preacher and Hayes (2008). I conducted separate analyses for each 
combination of entrance status, outcome variable and mediator. The 
independent variable (IV) was the ratings’ entrance status, comparing qualified 
nepots and non-nepots (D1 = 1, D2 = 0), and unqualified nepots and non-nepots 
(D1 = 0, D2 = 1). The outcome variables (DV) were performance at Time 2 
(current); well-being (Time 2) and differences in well-being between Time 1 and 2, 
respectively. Autonomy and control, along with appraisal 1 and 2 served as 
mediating variables. 
 
Performance (Time 2). With autonomy and control serving as the mediator 
for D1 and current performance as outcome variable, the direct effect of D1 on 
 
ratings’ current appraisal scores was significant B = 12.88, SE = 4.67, 95% CI = 3.69 
to 22.06, and so was the indirect effect, B = 4.16, SE = 1.67, 95% CI = 1.07 to 7.75. 
This suggests that qualified nepotistic ratings’ increased perceptions of autonomy 
and control contributed to their higher performance scores when compared to 
non-nepotistic ratings. 
 
Turning to the comparison between unqualified nepotistic ratings and 
non-nepotistic ratings, the direct effect of D2 on performance was significant, B = 
 
-40.08, SE = 5.04, 95% CI = -50.00 to -30.17. However, the indirect effect through 
autonomy and control was not significant, B = -.76, SE = 1.91, 95% CI = -4.71 to 
2.79. This means that (lowered) perceptions of autonomy and control did not 





Well-being. Next I examined the contributions of autonomy and control to 
ratings’ psychological well-being. The direct effect of D1 on well-being at Time 2 
 
was not significant B = .15, SE = .33, 95% CI = -0.50 to .79, but the indirect effect 
via autonomy and control was significant B = -.12, SE = .67, 95% CI = -.30 to - 
.02. This suggest that higher levels of autonomy and control observed in 
qualified nepots relative to non-nepots had a protective effect on qualified 
nepots’ well-being. In contrast, neither the direct effect of D2 on well-being, nor 
the indirect 
 
effect via autonomy and control was significant, B = .63, SE = .34, 95% CI = -0.04 
to 1.30 and B = .03, SE = .05, 95% CI = -.04 to 1.55, respectively. These findings 
suggest perceptions of (lower) autonomy and control did translate into lower 
levels of well-being for unqualified nepots relative to non-nepots at Time 2. 
 
Using Appraisal 1 and Appraisal 2 as mediators of the effects of D1 on well- 
 
being at Time 2 indicated the direct and indirect effects were not significant, B = 
 
.07, SE = .33, 95% CI = -.57 to .71 vs B = -.05, SE = .04, 95% CI = -.02 to .01 and B = 
.32, SE = .35, 95% CI = -.37 to 1.01 vs B = -.09, SE = .06, 95% CI = -.26 to .02, 
respectively. Turning to the comparison between unqualified nepots and non-
nepots, the direct effect of D2 on well-being was not significant, B = .04, SE = .36, 
95% CI = -.23 to 1.18, but there was an indirect effect via Appraisal 1, B = .19, SE = 
 
.09, 95% CI = .01 to .39, whereas the indirect effect via Appraisal 2 was not 
significant, B = .47, SE = .41, 95% CI = -.34 to 1.28 vs B = .22, SE = .15, 95% CI = -.08 





at the time of entering the force contributed to lower levels of psychological 
well-being at Time 2. 
 
Finally, I also examined whether variations in autonomy and control 
contributed to differences in well-being between Time 1 and 2. The results 
indicated that there was a significant direct effect of D1, B = 1.89, SE = .83, 95% CI 
 
= .25 to 3.53, but the indirect effect of D1 via autonomy and control was not 
significant, B = .07, SE = .14, 95% CI = -.09 to .51. In keeping with the results 
reported earlier, neither the direct effect of D2, nor the indirect effect of D2 via 
autonomy and control was significant, B = 1.58, SE = .87, 95% CI = -.15 to 3.30 and 
B = .06, SE = .16, 95% CI = -.18 to .48, respectively. This indicates that autonomy 
and control did not mediate the changes in psychological well-being experienced 




3.3.2.2.2. Commissioned officers 
 
A series of analysis of variance were conducted to compare the responses 
of qualified nepotistic officers and non-nepotistic officers. The results revealed no 






The results of Study 3 supported the prediction that qualifications are 





organisations as a whole. Focusing on a large public service organisation in the 
Caribbean, the present study highlighted detrimental effects of hiring nepotistic 
personnel, who are unqualified for the job. In particular, compared to non-
nepotistic personnel, unqualified nepotistic personnel displayed lower levels of 
psychological well-being and they performed worse on the job as indicated by 
lower appraisal scores. What is more, the performance of unqualified 
nepotistic personnel also appeared to decline over time, which was not the 
case for any of the other participant groups studied. 
 
A very different picture emerged for qualified nepotistic personnel. Unlike 
any of the other groups studied, qualified nepotistic personnel displayed an 
increase in psychological well-being over their assessment period. A similarly 
positive picture emerged in the context of performance: qualified nepotistic 
ratings not only performed equally well as non-nepotistic ratings when entering 
the force; they also showed the steepest increase in performance, outperforming 
the other groups of participants in their most recent appraisal scores. 
 
Further analysis suggested that qualified nepotistic personnel’s 
performance gains are in part linked to perceptions of greater autonomy and 
control. In particular, compared to non-nepotistic and unqualified nepotistic 
personnel, qualified nepotistic ratings felt they had more autonomy and control in 
their work, and this boost in perceived autonomy and control was linked to better 





personnel are more likely to advance in influential roles because they feel more in 
control at work. Unqualified nepotistic personnel, on the other hand, did not 
benefit from increased perceptions of autonomy and control, and they performed 
significantly worse in their most recent appraisals. This is interesting because, 
after all, they lacked qualification unknown to most others in the force. 
 
Entrance status based on level of qualification also impacted individuals’ 
perceptions of organisational practices. Unqualified nepotistic personnel held a 
less critical stance regarding training and recruitment practices than qualified 
nepotistic or non-nepotistic personnel. They felt that merit was less important in 
recruitment than all other participants. Interestingly, qualified nepotistic 
personnel and non-nepotistic personnel shared similar views of organisations 
practices. For them, merit was more important than family connections in the 
hiring process. Thus, although qualified nepotistic personnel did not act as 
agents of change, they nevertheless endorsed meritocratic principles to a greater 
extent than unqualified nepotistic personnel, who seemed more complacent and 
less critical of nepotistic practices in the force. 
 
Unexpectedly, no reliable differences were found in terms of organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, role conflict, and relationships with superior and 
colleagues. Qualified and unqualified nepotistic personnel did not seem to differ 
from their non-nepotistic counterparts in these domains. The resulting null effects 





qualifications do not affect personnel on these outcomes; the effects may be 
smaller or the measures might have been less reliable thereby hampering the 
power of the statistical tests. It may be the case that the groups do not differ, 




3.4. Study 4 
 
In a final study, I aim to establish whether the actual consequences of 
hiring qualified and unqualified nepots (uncovered in Study 3) align with people’s 
perceptions of nepotistic hirings. It is important to understand both the actual 
and perceived consequences of nepotism in order to gain a more complete 
perspective of this important phenomenon. As in Study 3, in the present study I 
focus on employees’ commitment and well-being as well as the amount of 
autonomy and control employees experience within their respective workplaces 
as outcome variables. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, perceptions of nepotism are typically negative, 
although as I have shown in Chapter 2 there are also important cultural 
differences. Studies of managers’ perceptions also indicate that perceptions of 
nepotism are complex and people realise that there are both positive and 
negative dimensions to nepotism (Abdalla et al., 1998). 
 
To the best of my knowledge, only one study has examined people’s 





particular, using a simulated hiring scenario, Darioly and Riggio (2014) asked 
 
respondents to evaluate the consequences of hiring a leader with and without 
 
family ties, and with and without relevant qualifications, respectively. The present 
 
study uses a similar approach using a simulated hiring scenario. However, unlike 
 
Darioly and Riggio (2014), in present study I focus on the perceived consequences 
 
for all employees, not only for leaders. This is a critical distinction because 
 
people’s reactions to nepotism may be exacerbated in case of a leader. 
 
Furthermore, Darioly and Riggio’s (2014) study focused on people’s perceptions in 
 
terms of the competence of the leader and the leader’s perceived career 
 
progression. In contrast, in the present study, and drawing on the findings of 
 
Study 3, I focus on the perceived consequences for employees’ commitment, 
 







3.4.1.1. Participants and design 
 
Three hundred and seventy-one undergraduate students were initially 
recruited to participate in this study. Five participants were excluded as they did 
not complete the survey to the end or failed pre-planned attention checks, 
leaving a final sample of 286 undergraduates (224 females, Mage = 30.62, SDage = 





employed a 2 (nepotism: nepotistic vs. non-nepotistic) x 2 (qualification: 




3.4.1.2. Procedure and materials 
 
Participants were invited to take part in a study of how people perceive 
different workplaces. At first, all participants read a description of a company, 
Firm X, which specialises on bakery products: 
 
Firm X started in 1860 as a family business.  Mrs X who loved to bake 
decided she would make cakes and cookies to sell to her neighbours to raise 
her household income.  Mrs X baked goods were a hot favourite in her 
neighbourhood and the demands quickly rose.  With increasing demands 
Mrs X opened up a bakery specialising in cakes and cookies in the local town. 
She started this bakery with her daughter and some initial financial 
investments from friends and family members. Firm X has expanded into a 
multinational enterprise and is now manufacturing baking products for 
supermarkets across the UK and Europe. Recently, the company secured a 
contract to sell their products in Brazil. The production is largely kept in-
house with 250 core staff working at three production sites and twelve 
distribution centres.  Firm X is a private limited company but has ambitions 





In what followed, participants continued to read one of two versions of a 
vignette that implied that hiring and promotion practices in the firm were either 
nepotistic or non-nepotistic (shown in brackets). 
 
In keeping with its family heritage (/global outlook), the company is still (/no 
longer) run by members of Family X. Furthermore, newcomers to the 
company often have (/do not have) existing family connections with the 
company. Jobs are advertised to the wider public, but the company 





Following this scenario, participants responded to two questions that served 
as manipulation check: ‘How common is it that employees have family 
connections in this organisation?’  and ‘To what extent does the company 
encourage the hiring of relatives of employees?’. The response scale ranged from 
1 (not at all common; not at all) to 7 (very common; very much). 
 
Finally, participants read one of two versions of a vignette that implied that 
qualifications were either important in hiring and promotion decisions or that 
qualifications did not impact hiring and promotions (shown in brackets). 
 
Hiring and promotion decisions are very transparent (/not very transparent). 
The company always seeks to ensure (/does not seek to ensure) that 





demonstrable skills and expertise to carry out their work effectively. 
Examples of qualifications include educational degrees, professional 
accreditations, training certificates, and previous or current employment. 
Qualifications are checked carefully (/sometimes ignored) in hiring and 
promotion decisions. As a result, only qualified individuals are hired or 
promoted (/unqualified individuals are sometimes hired and promoted) to 




The vignette was followed by two manipulation checks items: ‘How likely is it 
that employees are hired or promoted, who do not have the right qualification 
level?’, ‘How likely is it that staff are taking on responsibilities without having the 
right qualification?’. The response scale ranged from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very 
likely). Participants then responded to 21 items measuring participants’ 
perceptions of what it is like to work in Firm X, which served as outcome measure. 
In particular, participants indicated their perceptions of (a) employees’ 
identification with Firm X (three items; e.g., ‘Employees identify with Firm X’), (b) 
employees’ well-being (two items; e.g., ‘If they had the choice, employees would 
choose to work for Firm X’), (c) employees’ commitment to Firm X (two items; 
e.g., ‘Employees are strongly committed to Firm X’), (d) employees’ trust (two 
items; e.g., ‘Employees have full trust in Firm X’), (e) employees’ job satisfaction 





worthwhile’), (f) employees’ ability to solve problems (three items; e.g., 
‘Employees in Firm X are dealing with problems well’), and (g) employees’ 
autonomy and control (four items based on Jackson et al., 1993; e.g., 
‘Employees in Firm X feel that they can determine the methods and procedures 
used in their work’). All response scales ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
 
(strongly agree). At the end, participants were debriefed on the purpose of the 






3.4.2.1. Data preparation 
 
I created singled indices for the manipulation checks by collapsing two 
items measuring perceived prevalence of nepotism (r = .88, M = 4.08, SD = 2.48) 
and importance of qualification (r = .87, M = 3.61, SD = 2.27), respectively. Next, I 
submitted the 21 items measuring employees’ perceptions to a principal 
component analysis using a parallel analysis method (Horn, 1965), which revealed 
two underlying factors that jointly explained 70.52% of the variance in the 
outcome measures: one factor that loaded on the four items measuring 
autonomy and control, and one factor that loaded on the remaining 17 items 
measuring various aspects of employee commitment and well-being. Thus, I 





measuring autonomy and control (α = .90, M = 3.84, SD = 1.30), and the 17 items 




3.4.2.2. Manipulation check 
 
Participants reading the nepotistic firm vignette thought that hiring and 
promotion procedures were more nepotistic than participants reading the non-
nepotistic scenario (nepotistic: M = 6.37, SD = .77; non-nepotistic: M = 1.77, SD = 
1.04), t(284) = 42.60 , p < .001. Similarly, participants perceptions of the 
importance of qualifications for hiring and promotion practices differed between 
experimental conditions (qualified: M = 5.51, SD = 1.29; non-qualified: M = 1.65, 
SD = 1.10), t(284) = 27.16, p < .001. This suggests that the experimental 




3.4.2.3. Main analysis 
 
Commitment and well-being. I submitted the composite commitment and 
well-being scores to a 2 (nepotism: nepotistic vs. non-nepotistic) x 2 (qualification: 
qualified vs. unqualified) analysis of variance, which revealed a significant main 
effect of nepotism, F(1, 282) = 119.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .297. Employees in the 
nepotistic firm were perceived to be more committed and thought to experience 
greater well-being (M = 5.25, SD = .97) than employees in the non-nepotistic firm 
(M = 3.92, SD = 1.16). There was also a statistical significant main effect of 
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qualification, F(1, 282) = 16.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .057. Employees in the firm valuing 
qualifications were thought to be more committed and to experience greater well-
being (M = 4.35, SD = 1.34) than employees in the firm that did not value 
qualification (M = 4.84, SD = 1.12). There was no statistical significant interaction 
between nepotism and qualification, F(1,282) = 1.94, p = .165, ηp2 =.007. As shown 
 
in Table 3.4 post-hoc comparisons indicate that nepotistic environments were 
thought to lead to more positive outcomes for employees, even when the firm 
ignored qualifications in promotion and hiring decisions. Furthermore, post-hoc 
comparisons suggested that qualifications were only perceived to be important 
for non-nepotistic work environments, but not for nepotistic work-
environments (although the difference between the two work environments did 






Perceived employee commitment and well-being in experimental conditions  
Measures M SD N 
    
Non-nepotistic; not qualified 3.58a 1.18 71 
Non-nepotistic; qualified 4.25b 1.05 71 
Nepotistic; not qualified 5.09c 1.04 74 
Nepotistic; qualified 5.43c 0.87 70 
 
 
NB: Means not sharing a common subscript within columns are significantly 





Autonomy and control. Turning to the second outcome variable, I 
submitted the composite autonomy and control scores to the same analysis 
of variance performed on the first outcome variable. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of nepotism, F(1, 282) = 26.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .085. 
 
Employees in the nepotistic firm were perceived to have more autonomy and 
control (M = 4.22, SD = 1.18) than employees in the non-nepotistic (M = 3.46, SD = 
1.30). Neither the main effect of qualification nor the interaction between 
qualification and nepotism was significant, Fs < 1. Post-hoc comparisons 
confirmed that qualifications were perceived to be inconsequential for 
employee’s autonomy and control regardless of whether the work environment 






Perceived employee autonomy and control in experimental conditions  
Measures M SD N 
    
Non-Nepotistic; not qualified 3.48a 1.28 71 
Non-nepotistic; qualified 3.45a 1.32 71 
Nepotistic; not qualified 4.28b 1.18 74 
Nepotistic; qualified 4.15b 1.21 70  
 
NB: Means not sharing a common subscript within columns are significantly 







Study 4 revealed employees from a nepotistic firm were perceived to be 
more committed and thought to experience greater well-being and greater 
autonomy and control than employees in a non-nepotistic firm. Qualifications 
were only perceived to play a role for employees’ commitment and well-being, 
but not for employees’ autonomy and control. In addition, there was some 
indication that participants discarded qualifications altogether in their 
perceptions of the nepotistic firms; only for the non-nepotistic firm participants 
differentiated between work environments that valued (vs. did not value) 
qualifications. 
 
The present findings did not align to with previous expectations it 
underscore the notion that people may be inclined to underestimate the 
importance of qualifications for nepotistic hirings and promotions. The finding 
that the consequences of nepotism were perceived to be positive is curious and 
contrasts with a sizable literature, which suggests that people’s perceptions of 
nepotism tend to be negative in Anglo-American cultural settings (where the 
present study was conducted). However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the notion 
that nepotism can be beneficial is by no means unfounded. Chrisman, Chua and 
Litz (2004) proposed nepotistic family run firms are more likely to have higher 
levels of altruism than non-family firms; as such employees are more likely to feel 
supported, experience higher levels of autonomy and motivation to accomplish 





values with the firm (Schulze et al. 2001), which leads them to perform more 
efficiently and have higher levels of optimism leading to better psychological well-
being (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Employees with the nepotistic firms may identify 
more strongly with the firm so they have a sense of shared social identity which 
leads the employee to support the goals of the firm, which in turn supports the 
employees’ sense of being part of a group. This is consistent with the findings of 
Haslam et al. (2009) arguing that social identification with a workgroup can lead 
to long term positive outcomes for employees’ well-being and general morale 
because of the support factor offered by the firm to its employees. 
 
It is curious that participants in the present study tended to perceive 
qualifications as somewhat less consequential, especially bearing in mind the fact 
that the study was conducted with university students (in active pursuit of a 
qualification). This suggests that at least in the present sample, people’s 
perceptions do not align with empirical finding showing that competent 
individuals experience greater levels of autonomy, control and intrinsic 
motivation; all of which leads to better psychological well-being (e.g., Fisher, 
1978; Ryan, 1982). Studies also show that employees who perceive their firm to 
have an unbiased evaluation process in relation to promotion and bonuses have 
higher levels of employee satisfaction and commitment to the organisation 







The present research extends a small body of empirical research on the 
actual and perceived consequences of nepotism for individuals and 
organisations, and how those consequences may (or may not) differ as a function 
on qualifications. Focusing on the actual consequences of nepotism, it appears 
that when recruits are nepotistic and suitably qualified, having family ties can be 
beneficial. Qualified nepots can flourish in their jobs, experiencing more 
autonomy and control, enhanced well-being, and higher levels of performance. 
Thus, even though they may have had the opportunity to join the organisations 
in part through nepotistic kinship networks, qualified nepots can prove 
themselves to be of value to the organisation. In contrast, the present research 
highlights the negative effects of nepotistic hiring without a suitable level of 
qualification. Individuals who enter organisations on the basis of kinship 
networks without qualification may underperform and may also experience 
greater psychological distress. Nepotistic hiring might have done them (and the 
organisation) a dis-favour after all. 
 
When looking at people’s perceptions of nepotism, a different picture 
emerges. It would appear that people have a limited understanding of the 
importance of qualification in determining positive and negative consequences 
of nepotism; at least in the sample studied. While it remains to be seen whether 





findings suggest that individuals involved in hiring and promotion decisions would 
 
benefit from further education and training regarding the consequences of 
 







4.1. Chapter summary 
 
Nepotism is generally stereotyped as a dysfunctional, ineffective, unfair, 
and unethical process of hiring a relative (e.g Arasli & Tumer 2008; Abdalla et al 
1998). This train of thought may lead people to believe that any practice 
associated with nepotism has a negative effect on employees’ performance and 
reduces organisational effectiveness (e.g. Riggio & Saggi 2015). The aim of the 
present research was to dispel some of the myth around nepotism and expand 
our understanding of variables that predict the endorsement of nepotism, as well 
as delineating the actual and perceived consequences of nepotism. 
 
This discussion chapter provides a summary of findings for each empirical 
study. I then move on to look at the contributions to the literature before 
discussing some practical implications of the present research for individuals 
and organisations. I then proceed to look at limitations before concluding with a 




4.2. Main findings 
 
Study 1 was a correlational study conducted in the UK; from this study we 
learnt there was a relationship between the endorsement of nepotism and SDO. 
This new finding suggests that the more individuals endorse SDO the more they 





differentials. As such, the study provides, for the first time, direct empirical 
evidence for a link between nepotism endorsement and support for a 
concentration power in the hands of a selected view. 
 
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. In 
addition to measuring SDO, the study also included measures of the extent to 
which people endorsed meritocratic ideologies, were family oriented, and 
whether people saw nepotism as an opportunity for self-advancement. In 
addition, the study also included measures of people’s perceptions of nepotism – 
whether nepotism was perceived to be efficacious, consistent with (prescriptive 
and descriptive) social norms, and fair. Finally, and importantly, Study 2 was 
conducted in different cultural settings, sampling participants from countries that 
differed on the cultural dimensions of power distance and collectivism. The 
results showed that India – a collectivistic high-power distance country - had the 
highest incidence of hiring relatives without merit and endorsing nepotism 
compared to the USA – a individualistic country with low power distance. Trinidad 
and Greece fell in the middle in terms of participants’ exposure to, and 
endorsement of, nepotism. 
 
Turning to individual-level predictors of nepotism, the findings indicated 
the more individuals endorsed nepotistic practices, the more they valued family 





advancement, and the less they endorsed meritocratic ideologies. Once again, 
SDO also emerged as a significant predictor of nepotism endorsement. 
 
Further analyses revealed that differences in SDO mediated country-level 
differences in the endorsement of nepotism. Meanwhile, family orientation 
contributed to explain differences between the USA and India, but it did not 
contribute to explain differences between the USA and Trinidad. 
 
Previous research conducted in Europe and America suggested nepotism was 
more common in the private sector than in the public sector (Abdalla et al., 1998; 
Bellow, 2003; Scoppa, 2009). Data derived from American and India participants 
concur with these findings; however Greek participants thought nepotism was 
more common in the public sector than the private sector, whereas Trinidadians 
did not differentiate between the private and the public sector. Interestingly, 
country-level differences in the prevalence of nepotism notwithstanding, 
participants in all countries appeared to overestimate the prevalence of nepotism 
using their own personal experience as a reference point. Figure 1  below 
summaries the conceptual model that underpins the present findings for 




























Having found evidence for a number of theoretically-derived predictors of 
nepotism endorsement, in Chapter 3 I turned my attention to actual (Study 3) 
and perceived (Study 4) consequences of nepotism, looking at the moderating 
role of qualifications. Study 3 was conducted within an arm of the Defence Force 
in the Caribbean. Service personnel provided self-reports of current and former 
family members enrolled in the service and their level of qualification on entry 
into the service; this was validated by qualification certificates in the individual 
service personnel file. This data gathering allowed me to separate respondents 
into three groups: qualified nepotistic ratings, unqualified nepotistic ratings and 
non-nepotistic ratings. I then compared the three groups in terms of 
psychological well-being, performance and various facets of work attitudes and 
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The results showed that, compared to unqualified nepots, qualified nepots 
benefited from greater psychological well-being over time and they performed 
better on the job than either non-nepots or unqualified nepots. Qualified nepots 
also benefited from enhanced perception of autonomy and control when 
compared to the other groups. Unqualified nepots, on the other hand, displayed 
poorer levels of psychological well-being and lower levels of performance than 
non-nepots and qualified nepots. 
 
 In a final study, I sought to shed further light onto people’s 
perceptions of the consequences of nepotism, again with a particular focus 
on qualifications. A key question was whether people – in this case students 
sampled in the UK – would differentiate between nepotistic work 
environments that differed in terms of the importance of qualifications for 
hiring and promotion decisions. To this end, I asked participants to read one 
of four vignettes depicting either a nepotistic or a non-nepotistic work 
environment in which qualifications were either important or not important. 
Participants then rated the vignettes in terms of employees’ commitment 
and well-being along with autonomy and control. 
 
The results showed that participants showed little appreciation of the 
importance of qualifications for nepotistic employees. Interestingly, employees in 
nepotistic settings were perceived to be more committed and were thought to 
experience greater well-being and greater autonomy and control than employees 
in the non-nepotistic setting, regardless of the importance the firm placed on 
qualifications. Only for the non-nepotistic firm participants felt qualifications had 
an impact on employee commitment and well-being, but I found no significant 
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differences in terms of employees’ autonomy and control. All in all, Studies 3 and 
4 highlighted important discrepancies in terms of the actual and perceived 
consequences of nepotism and the moderating role of qualifications. The figure 
below summaries the conceptual model of actual and perceived consequences of 
nepotism, that underpins the findings of studies 3 and 4 

















4.3. Contributions to the literature 
 
Whilst some previous studies have examined differences in the prevalence of 
nepotism in different sectors and geographic regions (e.g., Abdalla et al., 1998; 
Hayejenh et al., 1994; Scoppa, 2009; Wated & Sanchez, 2015), there is a paucity 
of empirical studies on factors that contribute to the endorsement of nepotism. 
The present research contributes to fill this gap by establishing the importance of 
power distance and social dominance, family ties, and meritocracy and 
opportunism as factors that contribute to variations in nepotism endorsement. 
This work also introduces a new level of analysis, highlighting the 
Nepotism 
Qualification  
Psychological well being 
Performance  
Autonomy & Control  
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contributions individual-level variables make in determining people’s attitudes 
towards nepotism. What is more, I found some indication that the same 
construct that contribute to inter-individual differences in nepotism 
endorsement also contribute to explain differences between countries. 
 
Power distance was a key construct to understand between-country 
differences in people’s attitudes and perceptions towards nepotism. Drawing on 
Hofstede’s work on cultural differences, the findings of Study 2 were consistent 
with previous work showing that collectivistic high-power distance countries such 
as India endorse inequality amongst groups (Basabe & Ros, 2005) and show 
evidence of nepotism being perpetuated through personal and family networks 
(e.g., Basabe & Ros, 2005; Guhan & Samuel, 1997; Hooker, 2009). These findings 
add to this body of research by delineating the role of power distance along with 
collectivism in promoting nepotism. This is of course not to say that nepotism 
cannot be found in low power distance countries such as the USA. Indeed, 
according to Bellow (2003) nepotism seems to be very much part of the fabric of 
American governments, and there is ample evidence for hierarchical 
differentiation and inequality amongst American society (Adams & Bell, 2016). 
 
Providing direct evidence for the importance of family ties in promoting 
nepotism is another important aspect of this thesis. According to Chakrabarty 





individuals core beliefs, morals and values focus on duty and obligation towards 
members in their in-group (Basabe & Ros, 2005). My findings were consistent 
with, and extend those of Wated and Sanchez (2015) showing that nepotism is 
endorsed in collectivist cultures. 
 
The empirical findings of Study 2 also brought to light that support for 
nepotism is closely linked to the rejection of meritocratic ideologies. This is 
consistent with Song Hing et al. (2011), who indicated in their research that 
individuals who supported meritocratic practices are more inclined to support 
fairness and equality, and less likely to endorse nepotistic practices. This also 
falls in line with Fischer and Smith (2003), who suggested that the more a society 
is associated with a hierarchical culture the more its citizens are inclined to 
favour inequality over meritocracy. 
 
Researchers have been primarily concerned with the consequences of 
nepotism. Whilst perceptions of nepotism appear to be mostly negative, the 
literature also reveals a disparity between those emphasising positive aspects 
of nepotism and those emphasising negative aspects. However, thus far, there 
has been only limited research on factors that can interact with nepotism and 
that can determine whether the consequences of nepotism are detrimental or 
beneficial for individuals and organisations. 
 
Study 3 contributed to the literature by establishing that not all nepots are 





competent/sufficiently qualified for their roles or not. In particular, the results of 
Study 3 showed that the level of competence/qualification affects nepots’ 
psychological well-being over time, their performance levels and the level of 
autonomy and control people experience at the workplace. Whilst nepotism 
paired with a lack of qualification appeared to be uniquely detrimental, 
nepotism combined with sufficient levels of qualification appeared to have 
positive consequences for individuals and by extension organisations. Thus, the 
study underscores the importance of qualifications as a factor that shapes the 
(actual) consequences of nepotism for individuals and organisations. 
 
Study 4 was carried out against the backdrop of the findings of Study 3, to 
see how much importance people attach to qualifications in the context of 
nepotism. Padgett, Padgett and Morris (2014) were the first to empirically 
investigate the consequences of nepotistic hiring on perceptions of nepots 
concentrating on performance attributions made about the nepots. Their findings 
suggest nepots were perceived to be less competent and their performance was 
attributed to network connections rather than actual ability and effort. In 
addition, nepots were perceived negatively irrespective of their qualification. This 
contrasts with the results of Study 4, which indicated that people’s perceptions of 
the consequences of nepotism for the individuals are not only positive, but 
people also tend to assign little weight to the importance of qualification for 





consequences of nepotism are idiosyncratic to the population studied, whose 




4.4. Practical implications 
 
At the heart of this thesis was the fundamental belief that the findings can 
inform HR professional, managers and business owners, who are involved in the 
recruitment and promotion process and as such as gatekeepers to prevent or 
permit nepotistic practices. The research can also be applied to help nepots 
understand the consequences of being hired through nepotistic means. In 
Western societies nepotism is often viewed as a third world issue when in reality 
evidence for nepotism can be found around the globe. Practitioners can benefit 
from the present research by gaining a fuller understanding of the implications 
of nepotism for recruits, how nepotism may be perceived by others, as well as 
cultural factors and beliefs that can promote or stifle nepotistic practices. 
 
The findings presented in this thesis serve as a reminder that nepots can 
face dire consequences in terms of their psychological well-being and decreased 
levels of autonomy and control in the job when nepotistic hirings coincide with a 
lack of competence/ qualification. The findings also provide new insights into how 
people may perceive the consequences of nepotism. 
 
The empirical work presented in this thesis highlights the importance 





demonstrate that nepotism paired with competence can be beneficial for 
individuals and organisations. Suitably qualified nepots will have the level of 
competency required to carry out the job, whist having background information 
or knowledge of the day to day workings of the organisation before entering the 
organisation. This provides the employer with a well-equipped, competent 
individual who has the capacity, competence and support network to perform 
well. 
 
This thesis also highlights how nepotism can promote negative outcomes 
for nepots who lack competence/qualification to function effectively within the 
remit of their job, resulting in lower performance and poorer psychological well-
being. On the other hand, nepotism can also contribute to positive outcomes for 
those who are competent/qualified and have had a vested interest in the 
organisation on account of human capital transfer from their relatives who were 
or still a part of the organisation. 
 
In today’s society where holistic well-being is encouraged within the work 
place, it is vital to know that a lack of competence/qualification can place nepots 
at a disadvantage to the rest of the workforce. Following the recommendations 
set out by Laker and Williams (2003) to employ the most qualified person for the 
position regardless of their connections within the organisation appears to be 






Findings from Chapter 2 can be applied to promote a better understanding 
and awareness of why people endorse nepotism. In particular the findings related 
to cross-cultural differences could be applied to promote good intercultural 
relations by fostering a better understanding of why nepotism may be more 
widely endorsed in some cultural settings than in others. What is often perceived 
by Western societies as unfair, unethical, dysfunctional or ineffective can be 
better understood in terms of the cultural values and beliefs people hold, the 
obligations people may have to family and friends, whilst appreciating that 
nepotism is also practised in Western societies. 
 
Finally, the findings of Study 4 can help us understand how nepotistic 
practices may be perceived by others, in particular those about to enter the 
workforce (university students). The findings showed that people’s perceptions of 
the consequences of nepotism was remarkably positive. At the same time, the 
fact that relatively little value was placed on qualifications is somewhat 
concerning. This suggests that policy makers and education providers should do 
more to convey the benefits of acquiring skills and qualifications, focussing on 








Study 1 was conducted with undergraduate students. Samples drawn from 
student populations may not have been previously exposed to nepotism or 
nepotistic practices and may therefore be less likely to understand how 
nepotism works in the real world. The majority of students completing the 
questionnaire were first year undergraduates (59%), and their views may not 
necessarily represent the view of the UK population on the whole. 
 
Data for Study 2 was collected from a number of places via various 
sources. Data gathered from opportunity samples in India, USA, and Trinidad 
were not necessarily representative of the Indian, American, and Trinidadian 
population. That said, the samples were diverse and drawn from a sizable cross-
section of society in these countries. In contrast, in Greece data was collected 
almost exclusively from university staff. The views expressed by these 
participants may not necessarily align with the views of other segments of Greek 
society. Future research should include more representative samples drawn from 
a larger number of countries. 
 
An important limitation of Study 3 is that appraisal scores may have been 
influenced by the presence of family connection, independently of individuals’ 
performance on the job. However, systematic favouritism of nepotistic individuals 






It is possible that the results of Study 3 are idiosyncratic to the particular 
cultural setting and military context studied. The findings should be replicated 
before the results can be generalised to other settings or contexts. Similar 
reservations apply to Study 4, which was conducted in the UK with 
undergraduate students. It would be ideal to replicate the study with a more 
representative sample of individuals across all ages and with a wider range of 




4.6. Future research 
 
As indicated above, it would be beneficial in the future to add more 
countries to the cross-cultural study including both collectivist (high power 
distance) and individualist (low power distance) countries across the globe to test 
specific predictions derived from the present research. By sampling a wider set of 
countries that differ in power distance and collectivism (vs. individualism) firmer 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the cultural dimensions that are conducive to 
nepotism. 
 
The present research focussed primarily on qualifications as an indicator 
of competence. Future research should go beyond such a narrow definition of 
competence to include factors such as knowledge and skills, which are important 
to carry out a designated job competently, even without formal qualifications. In 





nevertheless acquire skills and knowledge that make one just as competent. It 
stands to reason that the findings presented in this thesis can be applied to 
competence defined more broadly, but empirical research is required to 
affirm (or reject) this assumption. 
 
Nepotism is a very personal subject to approach and often seen as taboo. 
In light of this, I would encourage longitudinal studies to be carried out within 
nepotistic and non-nepotistic firms. By employing a longitudinal approach one 
can establish a trusted relationship with individuals within the organisations and 







The present research adds to our understanding of nepotism by delineating 
factors associated with the nepotism endorsement, as well as the actual and 
perceived consequences of nepotism. The work has highlighted the importance of 
power distance and social dominance as constructs that affect people’s attitudes 
towards, and beliefs related to, nepotism. The work also points to the critical role 
of competence/qualification in determining whether the consequences of 
nepotism for the individual and organisations are positive or negative in relation 
to outcomes such as job performance and psychological well-being. 





of promoting well-being and autonomy on the job. This, however, also 
presents an opportunity and highlights the potential benefits of pursuing this 
line of research and disseminating the findings contained in this thesis. 
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System justification scale  
Please mark the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). 
1. In general you find society to be fair. 
2. In general the British political system operates as it should. 
3. British society needs to be radically restructured. 
4. Great Britain is the best country in the world to live in. 
5. In Britain most government policies serve the greater good. 
6. In Britain everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness 
7. Our society is getting worse every year. 
8. Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
 
Nepotism Endorsement 
Family Connections at the Workplace    Below, we would like to ask you questions 
about the practice of favouring one's own relatives, or the relatives of colleagues 
or friends, in the context of hiring decisions and promotions in organisations.  
Please express to what extent do you agree or disagree with the statements by 
marking the corresponding choice from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
How much do you agree or disagree with the practice of ... 
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1. Favouring relatives of members of an organisation over other individuals who 
do not have family ties 








Prevalence of Nepotism 
Family Connections at the Workplace   
How many people in your circle of family and friends were appointed ... 
______ .. either because they had relatives in the organization (1) 
______ .. or because relatives knew someone in the organization (2) 
______ .. without any family ties (3) 
 
How many people in your circle of family and friends were appointed ...  
______ .. only based on family connections (1) 
______ .. based on family connections AND merit (2) 
______ ..  only based on merit (3) 
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Family Connections at the Workplace   
Consider Trinidad/ USA/India (delete as appropriate) as a whole. What 
percentage of people are appointed ...  
______ .. either because they had relatives in the organization (1) 
______ .. or because relatives knew someone in the organization (2) 
______ .. without any family ties (3) 
 
Consider Trinidad/ USA/India (delete as appropriate) as a whole. What 
percentage of people do you think are appointed ...  
______ .. only based on family connections (1) 
______ .. based on family connections AND merit (2) 
______ ..  only based on merit (3) 
 
Perceptions of Nepotism 
How appropriate is the practice of favoring one's own relatives, or the relatives of 
colleagues or friends in the different sectors listed below.  Please mark the extent 
to which you think its inappropriate or appropriate with the following answers 1 
(very inappropriate) to 7 (very appropriate). 
1. Public Sector 
2. Private sector 
3. Armed Forces  
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How beneficial is the practice of favoring one's own relatives, or the relatives of 
colleagues or friends in the different sectors listed below. Please mark the extent 
to which you think its inappropriate or appropriate with the following answers 1 
(very inappropriate) to 7 (very appropriate). 
1. Public Sector 
2. Private sector 
3. Armed Forces  
Do you think the practice of favoring one's own relatives, or the relatives of 
colleagues or friends is…. Please mark the extent to which you think 1(definitely 
not) to 5 (definitely yes) to the following statements. 
 
1. Compatible with the principle that everyone should be treated equally. 
2. Compatible with the principle that the best and most hardworking people 
should move ahead. 
3. Compatible with the principle that people in need should receive help 
4. Compatible with the principle of fairness 
5. Endorsed by your friends 
6. Endorsed by your family 





Perception of Organisational Practices 
Perceived meritocracy 
In your view to what extend do you believe score on selection process to be 
important in the decision to enlist someone. Please express to what extent do you 
agree or disagree with the statements by marking the corresponding choice from 
(1 Not at all important) to 5 (Incredibly important).  
In your view to what extend do you believe competency to be important in the 
decision to enlist someone.  Please express to what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Not at 
all important) to 5 (Incredibly important).   
In your view to what extend do you believe being highly skilled (even if no formal 
education) is important in the decision to enlist someone.  Please express to what 
extent do you agree or disagree with the statements by marking the 
corresponding choice from (1 Not at all important) to 5 (Incredibly important). 
 
Perceived nepotism.  
To what extend do you believe education level to be important in the decision to 
enlist someone. Please express to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Not at all important) to 
5 (Incredibly important). 
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To what extend do you believe friends and family in the service to be important in 
the decision to enlist someone. Please express to what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Not at 
all important) to 5 (Incredibly important). 
To what extend do you believe previous experience to be important in the 
decision to enlist someone. Please express to what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Not at 
all important) to 5 (Incredibly important). 
 Discord with Practice  
How often do you agree with the methods used by the service in the training 
process? Please express to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Always agree) to 5 
(Always disagree). 
How often do you agree with the methods used by the service in the 
recruitment and selection process? Please express to what extent do you agree 
or disagree with the statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 
Always agree) to 5 (Always disagree). 
How often do you agree with the methods used by the service in the 
performance/ appraisal process? Please express to what extent do you agree 
or disagree with the statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 
Always agree) to 5 (Always disagree). 
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Transparency of personnel selection.  
How transparent do you believe your organisation is in terms of recruitment 
and selection? Please express to what extent do you agree or disagree with 
the statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Very 
transparent) to (5 Not at all transparent). 
Fairness of performance evaluation 
‘I think my superior evaluated my performance objectively and without 
prejudice. Please express to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
statements by marking the corresponding choice from (1 Very objective) to (5 
very subjective). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
